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1. Abstract 
This thesis analyzes the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights’ use of the human right to 
property as a guarantee of indigenous peoples right to their ancestral territories. It takes on a 
comparative study of two cases of violation of indigenous peoples rights: The Western Shoshone in the 
United States and Guaraní communities in Bolivia. The analysis is carried out from a theoretical 
framework based on a discussion of the universality, and relativity, of human rights and arguments for 
and against group human rights. On this background, this thesis finds that the interpretation of 
indigenous peoples collective human rights to their ancestral lands is conflicting with the individual 
human rights framework. From this, two conclusions are drawn. First of all, the IACHR’s interpretation 
of human rights, in these particular cases, introduces a great degree of relativity into the concept of 
human rights. Secondly, this advancement of collective human rights meets acceptance in the case of 
Bolivia, while the United States refuse to recognize group human rights. Thus, the enjoyment of the 
collective human right to ancestral lands is enjoyed relatively by indigenous people depending on the 
country in which they live. 
 2
2. Problem Statement 
In the last decade the Inter-American human rights system has interpreted normative developments on 
the international level to mean that Indigenous Peoples have human rights to their ancestral lands, 
which in the American context are guaranteed through Article 21 of the American Convention on 
Human Rights, the article on property rights. This thesis will analyze this recognition of indigenous 
peoples´ collective property rights, which seems to break with the Western concept of individual 
property rights that have historically been the praxis. This will be done through a few case comparative 
study of four reports of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights: Three on the Guaraní 
Indigenous Peoples in Bolivia and the other report on the Mary and Carrie Dann case, sisters and 
members of the Western Shoshone Indigenous Peoples in the United States of America. The analysis of 
these cases will be carried out from a group rights perspective to reflect on the status of Indigenous 
peoples´ collective property rights in the context of the Americas. 
3. INTRODUCTION 
This thesis will analyze the Inter-American Commission of Human Rights interpretation of normative 
developments regarding indigenous peoples’ rights to their ancestral territory. Specifically, two cases 
will be analyzed: The Commissions reports on the case of Mary and Carrie Dann, Western Shoshone 
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People, in the United States and the case of communities of Guarani peoples being held captive in the 
Bolivian Chaco. It will be analyzed how these normative developments have been interpreted to mean 
that the Inter-American human rights instruments guarantee indigenous peoples collective property 
rights over the lands, that they have traditionally occupied and used. The principal human rights 
instrument in this protection has been the American Convention on Human rights and its Article 21 
regarding property rights. This interpretation seems to conflict greatly with the traditional view that 
human rights are individual rights vested in individual human beings. Thus, the analysis will be carried 
out from a theoretical discussion on the relativity, and universality, of human rights and individual and 
group human rights. The methodology used is a few case comparison study. Furthermore, given that 
human rights are not just a legal tool, but also a political project, the methodology section will also 
reflect on the value and importance of discourse. This should serve to answer the following research 
question: 
To what extent is the IACHR’s interpretation of indigenous peoples collective property rights 
compatible with the individual human rights framework? 
3.1. Background 
I shall in the following subsection attempt to present the context of the cases analyzed in this paper. 
This will be done by briefly sketching out the most important developments in indigenous peoples’ 
rights and, then, attempt to place the regional system within a context of the UN system of rights. 
Securing indigenous peoples property rights is an attempt to overcome the colonial legacy of conquest 
and subordination, which today have led to high degrees of discrimination and social exclusion of 
indigenous peoples. The first United Nations Special Rapporteur on the situation of the human rights 
and fundamental freedoms of indigenous peoples, Rodolfo Stavenhagen, sketched out the colonial 
legacy during an official visit to the Philippines: 
“In pre-Hispanic times Indigenous Communities held land collectively, but after the Spanish 
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conquest all lands became the exclusive patrimony and domination of the Crown. The colonial 
government, applying the theory of jura regalia, known as the Regalian Doctrine, distributed 
land grants to private individuals but also protected, under certain conditions, the pre-existing 
communal holdings. The American colonial administration inherited this system and the State´s 
control over the public domain was reinforced, communal landholdings were not legally 
recognized and private land titles were issued in accordance with new legislation” (Gilbert, 
2007: 94) 
First, I shall try to briefly sketch out the most important accomplishments in the field of the expanding 
normative developments of indigenous peoples’ rights at the international level. One of the first 
milestones within these developments took place in 1972, when an expert of the United Nations, José 
R. Martínez Cobo, was tasked with the assignment of carrying out The study of the problem of 
discrimination against Indigenous Peoples, a report that came to be known as the Cobo rapport. The 
study took on the task of collecting information on the discrimination of indigenous peoples and 
analyzing the concept of indigenous peoples. This study created the environment which led to the 
creation of the Working Group on Indigenous Peoples (IWGIA). From this point on, the problems of 
indigenous peoples were dealt with on a regular basis at the UN level. Another important milestone 
came in 1989 when the International Labour Organization (ILO) adopted its convention No. 169 
dealing with the problem of indigenous and tribal peoples. This document is still to this day the most 
important mechanism for the protection of the rights of indigenous peoples. From this point on, the 
collective will to look at the indigenous issue was at its high point and the year of 1993 was declared 
the international year of indigenous peoples by the UN general assembly. Few years after, in 1995, the 
decade of indigenous peoples (1995-2004) was declared by the General Assembly. Having past the 
decade, a revision of the issues suggested that the problems were not yet solved, which led to a 
resolution declaring the second decade of indigenous peoples (2005-2014) to be reigned in. (Burger 
and Castro, 2006: 109-111) 
Being the only legally binding instrument in the indigenous rights regime, the ILO convention 169 is, 
as mentioned, the pivotal protection mechanism available to indigenous peoples. However, it has its 
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shortcomings. It is of course only legally binding to those states which have ratified and signed the 
convention and very few nations have done so. Currently, 22 have ratified the convention. On the 
positive side, some of these are among the countries with the largest indigenous populations. Such as, 
for example, Bolivia, Guatemala, and Peru. On the negative side, powerful countries which generally 
set the agenda at the UN level have not ratified the convention and some of them have indigenous 
population. Among these one could mention the United States of America, Canada and Russia. In 
addition, the convention fails to frame the indigenous issues properly at the level of concepts: 
“Further shortcomings derived from the convention’s failure to recognize indigenous peoples 
as ‘peoples’ proper, to confer on them the right to self-determination, and to address 
contemporary issues such as intellectual property rights” (Barelli, 2010: 955-956) 
To overcome these shortcomings the UN took on work to elaborate the UN Declaration on the Rights 
of Indigenous Peoples. The Working Group on Indigenous Populations (WGIP) were tasked with the 
assignment of preparing a draft declaration. The draft declaration was “…essentially a product of 
indigenous peoples’ representatives and the five experts of the WGIP” (Barelli, 2010: 956). As a result 
the content was regarded as quite radical by the states once it reached the UN Commission on Human 
Rights. The criticism, voiced by the states, is at the centre of what this thesis intend to analyze. First, its 
definitions of indigenous peoples and their rights to self-determination clinched with the historical 
monopoly of states to collectively own territory. As Barelli (2010) states: “…the inclusion in the text of 
critical rights such as the right to self-determination and to collectively own ancestral lands seriously 
challenged the principle of state sovereignty” (956). This element was especially criticized by Asian 
and African states. However, this objection was more fundamental as they argued against not just the 
use of the concept of ‘peoples’, but rather they objected to the concept of indigenous peoples as a 
concept that in their belief did not apply to their regions, since all peoples were indigenous to these 
countries. (Barelli, 2010: 958) 
Furthermore, as it shall be discussed at length in the theory section of this paper, human rights have 
traditionally been understood as individuals protecting the human person with the only exception being 
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the people’s right to self-determination. As Barelli (2010) points out, the occurrence of collective rights 
in the document was a further problem for the states: “…the insistence on the collective dimension of 
indigenous rights  clashed with the Western individualistic conception of human rights that has come to 
dominate the current human rights system” (956-957). Nonetheless, the United Nations Declaration on 
the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) was finally adopted by the General Assembly in 
September 2007 and:  
“Despite being a soft law document, and thus lacking legally binding force, the UNDRIP has 
become the key instrument of the indigenous rights regime, confirming the crucial interplay 
between hard and soft law in the context of indigenous peoples’ rights” (Barelli, 2010: 957) 
The final declaration, however, did include both the concept of self-determination and also referred to 
indigenous peoples’ collective rights. Therefore, the UNDRIP “…is the first international human rights 
instrument to expressively recognize the right to self-determination to a sub-state group” (Barelli, 2010: 
959). The Declaration was, however, long underway and during this long process the work of fine-
tuning the definitional apparatus that was to make up the emerging indigenous rights regime, was 
supported by the regional human rights systems. Both the European, African and Inter-American 
Human Rights Systems contributed to this process. As Barelli (2010) puts it: 
“In particular, regional systems both strenghtened the global political process of recognition of 
indigenous rights and contributed to the legal process of clarification and interpretation of the 
relative normative content” (961)   
Even though the European and African human rights systems also contributed to this process, this paper 
will focus on the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR). Therefore, I shall ignore for 
the moment the other two regional systems’ contributions and focus on what occurred in the Inter-
American human rights system.  
On a parallel track to the developments at the UN level, the Inter-American system of Human Rights 
have contributed greatly to the developments of indigenous peoples’ rights. The fact that these 
developments took place in the Americas is no coincidence. The region has a large indigenous 
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population. Without counting in the US and Canada, the continent has 45 million indigenous people 
according to census data from 2010 (ECLAC, 2014: 36). As a consequence the indigenous problem 
was present since the beginning of the development of the Inter-American human rights system and the 
issue of land has been at the center of the problem: 
“…Article 39 of the 1948 Inter-American Charter of Social Guarantees required states to take 
the ‘necessary measures … to safeguard [Indigenous peoples’] lands, legalize their ownership 
thereof, and prevent the invasion of such by outsiders” (Tramontana, 2010: 248) 
By the 1970s, The IACHR had made reference to infringements on land rights of indigenous peoples 
and had been demonstrating that they were aware of these peoples’ special relationship with the land 
and its collective significance. The first time a normative approach to the matter was articulated was in 
the 1980s. In the case of Yanomami v. Brazil the Commission criticized Brazil for not taken the 
necessary measures to protect the well-being of the Yanomami peoples. The state had failed its 
responsibilities when infrastructural and exploitation activities were carried out within Yanomami 
territory and this violated the right to life, health and personal security as recognized in the American 
Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, it was argued. The Commission recommended that Brazil 
demarcated the boundaries of the Yanomami territories and took measures to assure the well-being. 
(Tramontana, 2010: 248-249) 
Two cases of special importance to the reinterpretation of indigenous peoples’ right to their ancestral 
territories took place in 2001 and 2007. In the 2001 case, Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community v. 
Nicaragua, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACrtHR) interpreted Article 21 of the 
American Convention on Human Rights (American Convention) on property rights to protect 
indigenous peoples right to collectively own their ancestral territories (Barelli, 2010: 975). In this case 
indigenous peoples’ special relationship with their ancestral territories were affirmed: 
“On this basis, the IACHR held that members of those groups who are characterized by a 
traditional collective form of organization, a spiritual relationship with their ancestry lands, and 
a communal system of ownership of the said lands, are entitled to protection provided by 
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Article 21” (Barelli, 2010: 975-976)_  
As a consequence, a right to property that has traditionally been thought of as only an individual right 
is used to protect indigenous peoples collective property rights to their ancestral territories. 
Furthermore, the Court emphasized that this right encompasses a broader relation to property, than one 
that protects an individual’s right to property of non-indigenous persons. In particular the concept 
encompasses a collective right of indigenous peoples to survival. A survival that requires indigenous 
peoples to have control over their ancestral territories for the reproduction of their culture, their own 
development and in order to be able to reach their life aspirations. (Barelli, 2010: 976-977) 
Furthermore, the Court argued that sometimes it may be necessary to restrict individual property rights: 
“…the IACHR observed that ‘restriction of the right of private individuals to private property 
might be necessary to attain the collective objective of preserving cultural identities in a 
democratic and pluralist society, in the sense given to this by the American Convention; and it 
could be proportional if fair compensation is paid to those affected pursuant to Article 21 (2) of 
the Convention.” (Barelli, 2010: 977) 
A further definitional clarification as to the extent of Indigenous Peoples right to their ancestral 
territories came in the 2007 case of Saramaka People v. Suriname. Here the Court clarified the extent 
to which indigenous peoples natural resources were protected under the American Convention. 
Furthermore, it clarified who are indigenous in the Inter-American context. The Saramaka People were 
brought to Suriname in the 17th century as slaves. Therefore, they are not indigenous to the American 
continent. However, as they preserved their cultural ties to the land, they are still considered indigenous 
peoples, the Court argued. In this case, the Court ruled that indigenous peoples rights to their ancestral 
lands would be meaningless without a right to the natural resources on the same land. Therefore, states 
must achieve the indigenous peoples’ - inhabiting the territory in question - free, prior and informed 
consent before granting concessions to resource (Tramontana, 2010: 257-259). 
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3.2. Methodological strategy 
This subsection will reflect on the methodology used in this paper. The task which is to be carried out 
in this thesis is a comparative study of two cases, which the Inter-American Commission on Human 
Rights have handled. The first of the cases is the Mary and Dann, sisters and members of the Western 
Shoshone peoples in the Western United States. The second case is the two country reports that the 
Commission did on Bolivia in 2007 and 2009, respectively, as well as the special report on the situation 
of captive communities in the Bolivian Chaco. The focus of this second case is the Guaraní indigenous 
peoples.  
Having two cases from two different countries, the study undertaken in this paper is of a comparative 
nature. In a comparative study there is a variety of methodological considerations to be taken into 
account. Being two different countries, two different sets of indigenous peoples and two different 
timelines, there are considerations in terms of time and space which should be carefully scrutinized.  
The purpose of a comparative study in Political Science is to make inference: “Inference is ‘using facts 
we know to learn something about facts we do not know” (Landmann, 2000: 13). This is where 
comparative studies can help us to learn more by the very nature of comparison as: “…political 
scientist compare countries that differ in ways that supply the requisite counterfactual 
situation” (Landmann, 2000: 14).  
There are three types of comparative studies: Single study comparison, few country comparison and 
large. As the names suggest, these are determined by the number of cases one chooses to study. 
Comparing only two cases, this study is a few case comparison. And in such a study there are certain 
methodological aspects to consider, specifically one should reflect on differences and similarities 
between the two cases and what these mean and how they affect the comparative study. Here one 
should reflect specifically, whether one chooses the most similar systems design or the most different 
systems design: 
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“Most similar systems design (MSSD) seeks to compare political systems that share a host of 
common features in an effort to neutralize some differences while highlighting others … Most 
different system design (MDSD), on the other hand, compares countries that do not share any 
common features apart from the political outcome explained and one or two of the explanatory 
factors seen to be important for that outcome” (Landmann, 2000: 70). 
In this case, this study follows the most different systems design. There are a lot of systematic 
differences between the two cases. Bolivia and the US have very different political systems. They are 
both democracies, but the political stability and institutional strength of the two nations differ greatly. 
Furthermore, the Latin American culture and the North American culture differ greatly as well. Finally, 
while Bolivia has a very large indigenous population, it is quite small in the United States. The one 
thing they have in common, which is the focus of this study, is the fact that they are both under the 
same regional system of human rights, which supposedly should represent the same universal moral 
system. These two cases, thus, make for interesting comparison.  
3.3. Methodological reflections 
This subsection will reflect on methodology and the importance of discourse and practicalities of doing 
a comparative case study. When dealing with discourse, it was outlined in the beginning of this 
introduction how long of a process the international recognition of indigenous peoples rights have 
been. Furthermore, it was stated that in this process the regional systems provided support for what was 
happening at the UN level. This support had two facets. First, the regional systems provided help on 
legal clarifications of what specific indigenous rights should entail. Secondly, and more relevant to this 
subsection, the regional initiatives showed that regional bodies endorsed the normative developments at 
the UN level: 
“By promptly responding to the political and normative developments occurring at the 
international level, regional systems sent an important message to both states and the other 
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international actors involved in this global process, namely that parallel processes of 
recognition of indigenous peoples’ rights were taking place in various parts of the 
world” (Barelli, 2010: 961) 
This shows how important and how powerful a role discourse can play. Words are not just words. 
Words have and inherent power, in the right context, and lead to action. This  paper will not carry out a 
discourse analysis. I shall, however, reflect in the following on the methodological considerations of 
analyzing and looking at discourse in political science context. In the realm of politics, the wording of 
policy is very important to the way other actors in society perceive the social reality. Imagine, for 
example, a new proposal for the introduction of a new tax on high incomes and it is named a 
millionaires’ tax. This can be understood by some as a means to a fairer distribution of the wealth in 
society, but then again others might see this tax as representing the envy that society holds against rich 
peoples (Brænder, Kølvråå and Lausten, 2014: 15): 
“Therefore, there is power in the language, and thus the language becomes a battle ground for 
the social life. The French philosopher and historian Michel Foucault separated such a power 
rooted in language from what he called ‘dominance’. ‘ Dominance’ is a trivial, brutal, direct 
and - in the eyes of Foucault - somewhat inefficient oppression through plain physical 
coercion. ‘Power’ in the above-mentioned meaning, on the other hand, is the influence that is 
embedded in the very way we perceive the world. Though the power rooted in language is 
more diffuse, its vast potential lies in the fact that the language user affects the way we 
understand a given societal issue - and whether we understand it as a problem at all - therefore, 
even the ‘suppressed’ will be able to maintain his belief in the fact that the choices he makes 
are his own choices” (Brænder, Kølvråå and Lausten, 2014: 15-16): _ 
Foucault’s wording of course makes it sounds like it is a game of deceit. Which politics can of course 
be considered to be to a certain extent. But talking about the extent to which a language user has power, 
does not necessarily mean that what is being communicated is wrong. Furthermore, one can hardly put 
labels such as wrong and right in politics. These concepts are, naturally, a matter of opinion and belief. 
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The political project of human rights, though, is a matter of determining what is the moral right and 
which of these rights are universal in the sense that they can be considered human rights. Still, 
determining this is open to discussion and here language and its power to change normative 
understandings of right and wrong are very relevant.  
One characteristic of human rights makes discourse on human rights extremely relevant. A 
characteristic that brings a great deal of relativity into the enjoyment of human rights on a global scale, 
as shall be discussed at length in the theory section. In the lack of a supranational authority that could 
oblige states to respect human rights, the implementation and safeguard of human rights are left to the 
nation state. There are mechanisms available to the UN to punish states for human rights violations: 
Sanctions. These, however, are rarely used and only in extreme cases of genocide or other crimes 
against humanity. Therefore, it is important how the international, and regional, human rights bodies 
talk about human rights. It is the only way they can put pressure on the nation states to respect these. 
The linguist Ferdinand Saussure provides further understanding to the importance of discourse. He 
explains it the following way. A linguistic sign is made up of a signifier (Signifiant) and the signified 
(signifié). As an example he uses a horse. The former is the sound of the word ‘h-o-r-s-e’ and the latter 
is the content of the word, namely a large animal with four legs, that you can ride on. The 
categorization that puts animals of varying characteristics under the same idea with regards to content 
is - language wise - not determined by a certain characteristic of these animals, but rather it is a social, 
linguistic convention. Therefore, discourse connects language and reality. Language affects reality as 
how we perceive it, and vice versa. Reality is only available to us through language. Hence, discourse 
sets the framework and structure of how we understand reality. (Brænder, Kølvråå and Lausten, 2014: 
19-20) 
So discourse is not just a way for international, and regional, human rights bodies to put pressure on 
nation states. It is also important that they set the agenda in terms of pushing for normative 
developments in the ever evolving understanding of human rights. Since, as Saussure points out, the 
social reality affects the language, but the language also affects the social reality. Language frames 
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reality and affects how, and what, we perceive to be the social reality.  
The decisions of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights are legally binding. (MacKay, 2002: 32) 
Naturally, this is subject to the same limitations as discussed above: In the end it is left to the nation 
state. The Commission, nonetheless, also have another mechanism available to them. Besides being the 
first step on the way to the court, receiving and examine petitions from individuals, groups of 
individuals and NGOs, the Commission is responsible for monitoring the implementation of the rights 
figuring in both the Convention and the Declaration. This is done primarily through initiating studies 
on the OAS member states and issuing country reports on the human rights situation in same member 
states. (MacKay, 2002: 32). The commission cannot, however, order the member states to comply and 
therefore makes recommendations. Again, in the lack of real enforcement mechanisms, the discourse of 
these reports are very important as to how human rights violations are framed. 
3.4. Presentation of the two cases 
I shall in this subsection briefly present two cases that will be studied in this paper. The first is a 2001 
admissibility report by the IACHR on the situation of the Western Shoshone people in the United 
States. Specifically a case presented before the Commission by the Mary and Carrie Dann, as a possible 
case to submit to the IACrtHR, since they had exhausted their options in the domestic legal system of 
the US. The second case is that of the Guaraní peoples in Bolivia. The Commission did a country report 
on the human rights situation in Bolivia in 2007, after having visited the country, and made a follow-up 
visit in 2009, which became a follow-up report on the situations witnessed in 2007. Furthermore, the 
Commission did a special report on the situation of slavery like condition among indigenous Guaraní 
peoples in the Bolivian Chaco. 
3.4.1. The Western Shoshone indigenous people in the United States 
Dealing first with the Dann case, the Case of Mary and Carrie, and the Western Shoshone indigenous 
people in general, extends far back in time. The Western Shoshone lands cover sixty million acres 
crossing the boundaries of several states in the Western US. Their land became disputed during the 
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Gold Rush in California in the 1800s. During the Civil War, in 1862, the The United States signed a 
Treaty of Peace with the Western Shoshone in order to get free passage to the gold fields of California. 
According to the terms of the agreement, the United States recognized the boundaries of the Shoshone 
People and there was no cession of land to the government (Fishel, 2006/2007: 623). 
The real dispute over the territory came when a new method to extract gold from the earth was 
discovered. A US quasi-judicial agency, the Indian Claims Commission (ICC) handled the Shoshone 
case and argued that the Shoshones had lost their aboriginal title and rights to the land, as a product of 
gradual encroachment on the land by non-indigenous people, and therefore the Shoshones could not 
assert their right to the land through US courts.  
The ICC, however, was a organ set down to compensate indigenous peoples for lost lands and 
resources. The Shoshone people, nonetheless, were still living on and using the lands in question 
according to their traditional customs. As a result, the Shoshone tried to fire their legal representation 
and protest to the case, but the proceeding went on and in 1979 a compensation of 15 cents per acre 
was paid by the US government to the Secretary of the Interior. As the Western Shoshone refused to 
accept the money, the Secretary of the Interior looked after it.  
Simultaneously, as the case in the ICC was being processed, the US Department of the Interior sued the 
Western Shoshone members for trespassing on the federal lands in question at the ICC, argued by the 
Interior to be federal lands. In the 1974 case against Mary and Carrie Dann, members of the Western 
Shoshone and sisters, the Ninth Circuit court of appeals agreed with the Western Shoshone sisters and 
rejected the United States’ argument of the Western Shoshone being extinguished. Instead of appealing 
the case of the disputed land title, the Interior pushed through an appeal in the Supreme Court on 
whether they could accept the compensation, worked out in the ICC case, on behalf of the Western 
Shoshone. The Supreme court ruled with the United States on this matter (Fishel, 2006/2007: 626-628).  
In the early 1990s, on behalf of the Dann sister, a petition was filed with the IACHR. In a final report 
on the case, deeming the case admissible for the IACrtHR, the Commission concluded that the US 
government had violated the property rights of the Western Shoshone and concluded that the US must 
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adopt legislation and other measures necessary to ensure the respect for the Western Shoshones’ right to 
property to their ancestral lands. The United States government did not accept the IACHR’s jurisdiction 
and a month later they proceeded with an armed seizure of 400 Western Shoshone horses (Fishel, 
2006/2007: 635). 
3.4.2. The Guaraní indigenous peoples in Bolivia 
Regarding the case of the captive Guaraní communities, there 320 Guaraní communities in the Bolivian 
Chaco. These are known as ‘free communities since they are not tied to specific geographic region and 
move around between region. They do this for various reason, be it ecological changes or pressure from 
estate owners. The Guaraní peoples in this region live of subsistence agriculture. However, arid lands 
are scarce and competition from estate owners, means that the Guaraní peoples usually get the poorest 
quality of land. The system of conditions analogous to slavery extends far back in time. The Guaraní 
peoples were able to resist Spanish colonization, but in he republican era the Guaraní people were 
defeated in the battle of Kuruyuki in 1892. This started a process of dispossessing the Guaraní peoples 
of their ancestral lands and at the end of the century large latifundia were established in the Bolivian 
Chaco. The Guaraní communities were forced to work on these estates in conditions of semi-slavery. 
Subsequent agrarian reforms in the 20th century did little to solve this situation. Thus, 600 families still 
persist in situations analogous to slavery in the Bolivian Chaco. (IACHR, 2008: 23-25)  
At the invitation of Bolivia, the IACHR visited the country between November 12th and 17th, 2006. In 
this period they observed a country that in the recent years had been characterized by institutional 
fragility and persistent social conflicts. Specific to indigenous peoples, the Commission observed are 
row of violations: The Commission observed institutional failure to regularization and distribution of 
indigenous peoples lands; resource extraction projects that were designed and executed without the 
proper participation of indigenous peoples; and the persistence of forms of debt bondage analogous to 
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slavery. This report was, as mentioned earlier, followed with another visit and another report in 2009.  
Finally, the special report on the situation of the Guaraní indigenous people and contemporary forms of 
slavery in the Bolivian Chaco, is based on a working and observation visit carried out June 9th-13th 
2008. Here, the representatives of the IACHR observed how approximately 600 Guaraní families lived 
and worked in situations of bondage analogous to slavery. These families rented the land from the 
landowner, but the arrangement was so that the Guaraní farm workers would never be able to pay back 
the debt. The Guaraní were often illiterate and the landowner would do the bookkeeping with no 
chance for the Guaraní to know the status of their back payments. The debt would in some situations be 
passed on to the next generation and it was observed how some landowners would even whip the 
Guaraní workers working the land. 
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4. THEORY 
Normative developments at the Inter-American levels have seen the Inter-American system of human 
rights, mainly the Inter-American Court of Human Rights and the Inter-American Commission on 
Human Rights, interpret the human right to property in the American declaration of the rights and 
duties of man as protecting indigenous peoples collective right to their ancestral territories in the 
Americas. As shall be discussed below, human rights have traditionally been thought of as individual 
rights protecting the individual from the collective, represented by the state. Some authors, however, 
criticize this as being a representation of the Western ideology of individualism. Some of these critics 
take a relative perspective and argue that what is morally right in the West cannot be applied globally 
because of different cultural foundations. Others point to the inherent individualism in Western political 
philosophy and prefer a communitarian perspective on moral goods.  
Given that this study is dealing with indigenous peoples in the Americas, the relativity-universality 
debate is of utmost relevance. This matter shall be dealt with in the following subsection. 
4.1. Human Rights – Relative or universal?  
Dealing first with the universal nature of human rights, this debate is not new. As Odello (2012) states: 
“…the debate between universality of human rights and cultural specificities is not new. When 
the Universal Declaration on Human Rights (UDHR) was adopted by the UN in 1948, the American 
Anthropological Association adopted a Declaration that criticised the universalistic approach 
underlying the first international document on human rights." (30) 
At the universalist end of the spectrum, Donnelly (2013) points to the very name of the concept human 
rights indicating that these rights are: equal, because one either is or is not human; inalienable, because 
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one cannot stop being human; and universal, because today we consider all members of the species 
Homo Sapiens human beings (10). Donnelly (2007) calls this conceptual universality (283). 
Some scholars claim that human rights are culturally relative and that the existing human rights have an 
inherent Western bias. Taking this into account, writing about indigenous people in Latin America from 
an universalist perspective on human rights might by these scholars be deemed Western cultural 
imperialism. Mutua (2001), for example, writes that the human rights corpus “falls within the historical 
continuum of the Eurocentric colonial project”. Donnelly (2013), however, negates the proposed 
Western characteristics of human rights:  
“Human rights as a matter of historical fact developed first in the West. This was not, however, 
due to any particular features of Western culture. Nothing in classical or medieval culture specially 
predisposed Europeans to develop human rights ideas” (106). 
 And goes on to say, what is rather thought provoking when one thinks of certain regions in the world 
today and their relations to human rights: 
“If the medieval Christian world of crusades, serfdom, and hereditary aristocracy could become 
today’s world of liberal and social democratic welfare states, then it is hard to imagine a place where a 
similar transformation would be impossible” (107). 
Therefore, human rights though they did develop first in the West, are not logical following of the pre-
modern period in the Western world, but rather a political decision to come up with a solution to the 
existing threats to human dignity. Negating their Western characteristics, Donnelly, furthermore, 
generally denies that it is possible to specify any foundations of human rights (19-21) and highlights 
how the 1966 international human rights covenants instead make reference to the “inherent dignity of 
the human person” (20). And even though Donnelly (2013) also denies that this inherent dignity can 
possibly be traced to a source in human nature (21), he states that this does not matter much to their 
practical application, neither are human rights the only social practice where this problem occurs: 
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“Like all social practices, human rights come with, and in an important sense require, 
justifications. Those justifications, however, appeal to ‘foundations’ that ultimately are a matter of 
agreement or assumption rather than proof” (Donnelly, 2013: 22). 
Having denied the specific cultural foundations of human rights and their incompatibility with certain 
cultures, Donnelly (2013) points to three universal aspects of the internationally recognized human 
rights: International legal universality, overlapping consensus universality and functional universality. 
These three aspects move beyond conceptual universality, which says nothing about “whether the rights 
recognized in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Human Rights 
Covenants are universal” (Donnelly, 2007: 283).   
Regarding the first of these three aspects, international legal universality, Donnelly (2013) states that 
these rights are universal because they have been “accepted by almost all states as establishing 
obligations that are binding in international law” (94). This is backed by the fact that, as of 2006, the 
six core international human rights treaties had on average 168 parties, which represents an 86 percent 
ratification rate (Donnelly, 2007: 288). Secondly, overlapping consensus universality points to the fact 
that “the moral equality of all human beings is strongly endorsed by most leading comprehensive 
doctrines in all regions of the world” (Donnelly, 2013: 96). Regarding the third aspect, with functional 
universality Donnelly (2007) argues that: 
“Human rights ideas and practices arose not from any deep Western cultural roots but from the 
social, economic, and political transformations of modernity. They thus have relevance wherever those 
transformations have occurred, irrespective of the pre-existing culture of the place” (287). 
The first two aspects outline the universal aspects of human rights by showing the near universal 
agreement on the existing list of international human rights, as well as an universal agreement on the 
very idea of humans being morally equal. The last aspect shows how human rights are not a Western 
cultural phenomenon, but rather a political response to the threats of modernity to human dignity, 
through the workings of market economies and bureaucratic states.    
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At the culturally relativist end of the spectrum, Mutua (2001) sees it differently and presents his 
metaphor of human rights made up three intertwined metaphors of savages, victims and saviors (SVS 
metaphor) that represents what he calls “the arrogant and biased rhetoric of the human rights 
movement” (206)  in which “actors are cast into superior and subordinate positions” (204). Regarding 1
the metaphor of the savage, Mutua (2001) points out that “human rights law frames the state as its 
primary target” (219), with the underlying belief that “the state is a predator that must be contained. 
Otherwise it will devour and imperil human freedom” (220). Mutua (2001), however, highlights, that 
the state is a “neutral, passive instrumentality – a receptacle or an empty vessel” (203) and which, 
therefore, cannot be the savage that human rights are targeted at, but rather: 
“The state should be unmasked as being a mere proxy for the real savage. That leaves the 
historically accumulated wisdom, the culture of a society, as the only other plausible place to locate the 
savage” (Mutua, 2001: 220). 
Mutua (2001) sees this as a reduction to a relationship in which “human rights violations represent a 
clash between the culture of human rights and the savage culture” (220-21) and highlights how “…
Western states use human rights as a tool of foreign policy against non-Western states” (223) and how 
“today, most activities of the ICJ, AI and the other Western-based INGOs…are focused on the Third 
World” (216). With all these aspects taken together, Mutua (2001) completes the metaphor of the 
savage by arguing that “…the predominant image of the savage in human rights discourse today is that 
of a Third World, non-European person, cultural practice, or state” (216). 
Regarding the second metaphor, Mutua (2001) argues that the “face of the prototypical victim is non-
white” (230). In Latin America, for instance, the “typical…victim is presumed to be indigenous” (231) 
and according to Mutua (2001), in the SVS metaphor, the native is portrayed as “weak, powerless, 
prone to laziness, and unable on his own to create the conditions for his development” (232) and the 
 With the “human rights movement” Mutua (2001) refers to the collection of norms, processes and institutions that traces 1
its immediate ancestry to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR)” (201).  
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“missionary zeal to help those who cannot help themselves is one of the logical conclusions of this 
attitude” (232).  
This brings it to the third metaphor, the savior, which “is constructed through two intertwining 
characteristics – Eurocentric universalism and Christianity’s missionary zeal” (Mutua, 2001: 233). 
Mutua (2001) argues that there “is a historical continuum in this impulse to universalize Eurocentrism 
and to ratify them under the umbrella of universalism” (234) and “INGOs are the human rights 
movement’s foot soldiers, missionaries, proselytizers” (240).  
Thus, to Mutua the human rights movement represents an extension of the Christian crusades and 
colonialism through the subjugation of the Third World under a system of Eurocentric values, where 
non-European cultures are represented as barbaric, savage cultures that can only be saved and cleansed 
through the implementation of human rights.  
As it has been seen above, however, even though human rights did first develop in the West, they were 
not a logical following of the pre-modern period in Europe. Furthermore, how can one claim that for 
example Asian culture is incompatible with human rights, if we look at how well it works in South 
Korea and Japan? Furthermore, the fact that human rights cannot be backtracked into the pre-modern 
period in Europe does not leave them groundless, because “overlapping consensus implies that human 
rights can, and in the contemporary world do, have multiple and diverse foundations (Donnelly, 2007: 
292). Following Donnelly’s term functional universality we see how human rights are the political 
response chosen to combat the threats to human dignity by states and markets.  
“The spread of modern markets and states has globalized the same threats to human dignity 
initially experienced in Europe. Human rights represent the most effective response yet devised to a 
wide range of standard threats to human dignity that market economies and bureaucratic states made 
nearly universal across the globe” (287-288). 
Thus, human rights are the chosen political response to a range of common threats around the globe 
that have been universalized through the spread of modernity to practically all the corners of the globe. 
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Nevertheless, Donnelly (2007) does not see human rights as the only imaginable response to these 
threats; it is merely the most popular choice: 
“In principle, a great variety of social practices other than human rights might provide the basis 
for realizing foundational egalitarian values. In practice human rights are rapidly, becoming the 
preferred option. I will call this overlapping consensus universality” (291). 
This brings it to the relative part of the concept “relative universality”. At the level of the concept, 
human rights are universal or near universal. But Donnelly (2013) identifies particularities at the 
moment of interpretation and implementation of these conceptual human rights.  
 Regarding the former, for example the human rights of article 5 of the Universal Declaration states that 
no one should be subject to torture, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. This, however, is 
interpreted differently in different parts of the world. As Donnelly (2013) points out, the death penalty, 
practiced in the United States, is by most European states considered cruel and inhumane (102). 
Regarding the latter, human rights, universal at the abstract conceptual level, are open for a variety of 
forms of implementation. Donnelly (2013) shows how the right to work and compensation for being 
jobless is open to a wide range of possible forms of implementation when one asks the questions of 
what is a fair compensation and what amount of time is fair to receive it (103). Thus in the 
interpretation and implementation of international human rights there is room for adaption to local 
cultures. As Donnelly (2007) puts it: 
“Although international human rights treaties often embody particular conceptions, and 
sometimes even particular forms of implementation, they too permit a wide range of particular 
practices” (299-300). 
These particularities surge due to the fact that human rights are implemented by sovereign nation states 
and as Donnelly (2007) highlights, except “in the European regional regime, supranational supervisory 
bodies are largely restricted to monitoring how states implement their international human rights 
obligations” (283), and as a result of this “…legal sovereignty introduces a considerable element of 
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relativity into the enjoyment of internationally recognized human rights in the contemporary 
world” (297). 
Consequently, what provides the relative to the concept of “relative universality,” is the fact that 
interpretation and implementation is left to the nation state. Therefore, enjoyment of these universal 
human rights is relative to the place where one lives (Donnelly, 2007: 283). Furthermore, given that 
there is great discrepancy in the respect for human rights between nation states of the world, where one 
lives has a great impact on the actual enjoyment of one’s human rights. In the case of indigenous 
peoples, it is part of the story that most of them inhabit where is referred to as the Third World. 
Regarding variation from international norms, Donnelly (2007) lists four criteria for grappling support 
for such deviations: 
▪ 1) “Important differences in threats are likely to justify variations even at the level of concepts. 
Although perhaps the strongest theoretical justification for even fairly substantial deviations 
from international human rights norms, such arguments rarely are empirically persuasive in the 
contemporary world (indigenous peoples may be the exception that proves the rule)” (300). 
▪ 2) “Participants in the overlapping consensus deserve sympathetic hearing when they present 
serious reasoned arguments justifying limited deviations from international norms” (300). 
▪ 3) “Arguments claiming that a particular conception or implementation is, for cultural or 
historical reasons, deeply embedded within or of unusually great significance to some 
significant group in society deserve, on their face, sympathetic consideration” (301). 
▪ 4) “Tolerance for deviations should decrease as the level of coercion increases” (301). 
To conclude on this subsection, it seems that Mutua’s rejection of human rights as Western imperialism 
is going a bit too far. Certainly, Mutua makes a good point in the INGOs over focus on violations in the 
Third World. One must say of course, that human rights violations are greater in number in the Third 
World, but maybe the INGOs can also be said to have been neglecting a bit the countries harboring 
their headquarters. Donnelly’s point of how human rights developed as a response to the threats of 
markets and modern nation states which was spread out through globalization of these institutions, 
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though, provides a better explanation of the practical human relations that led to the adherence to 
human rights on a global scale. The question is how much relativity does Donnelly allow in his concept 
of relative universality. 
4.2. Individual and group human rights   
As discussed in the section above human rights have traditionally been thought of as the individual 
human’s protection against the violating national state and the threats of the market. As derivative, 
rights in Western political philosophy have been divided between the individual rights of human 
individuals and the collective rights of sovereign nation states. This adherence to the individual, and 
only individual, human rights have been criticized by communitarian scholars, as well as by other 
group rights advocates. This section will deal with the problem of individual and collective human 
rights.  
As discussed in the subsection above, according to Donnelly human rights are not a Western 
phenomenon, but rather a response to modernity and just happened to develop first in the West, because 
this was the birthplace of modernity. Furthermore, human rights may have various foundations given 
that the moral equality of all human beings is strongly endorsed by most leading comprehensive 
doctrines in all regions of the world, as stated by Donnelly. Nonetheless, the fact of the matter is that 
human rights did develop first in the West and seem to be strongly influenced by Western political 
philosophy and its adherence to individualism. According to Freeman (1995): 
“The doctrine of human rights affirms two fundamental principles of Western liberalism. The 
first is that the human individual is the most fundamental moral unit. The second is that all human 
individuals are morally equal” (25). 
Accordingly, this affirms the individual character that has been given to human rights traditionally. As 
Freeman continues, however: 
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“…the doctrine belongs to an international discourse which also affirms two collectivist 
principles. The first is that states are the primary agents of international relations. The second is that 
states represents nations” (25) . 
Consequently, states had to respect individual human rights. But in liberal theory, there was also an 
expectation that states (or governments) should reflect the ‘consent of the governed’ according to 
Locke or the ‘general will’ according to Rousseau (Freeman, 1995: 25). In this doctrine, collective 
rights were those of the states as representative of the nation, or the population in other words. In 
extension of this, in the UN human rights system the right of peoples to self-determination is among the 
human rights framework. The common Article 1 of the two 1966 international human rights covenants 
declarers that “…all peoples have the right to self-determination” (Freeman, 1995: 25). This Article 
have widely been accepted to mean that “…the populations of colonial territories have the right to form 
nation-states” (Freeman, 1995: 25). It has, however, been interpreted by some proponents of collective 
human rights to “…express the aspirations of various national and ethnic minorities, and of indigenous 
peoples”. (Freeman, 1995: 25). In general, however, the majority of the human rights acknowledged in 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights are expressed as individual rights (Freeman, 1995: 27). 
Furthermore, this dichotomy between the collective rights of states, as representing nations or peoples, 
and the individual rights of citizens represents a vacuum in the classical liberal theory. Placed in the 
center of this vacuum are minorities. If nation states are supposed to represent the general will of the 
majority, then what about the will and interests of minorities within nation states. Locke and Rousseau 
showed little interest in the rights of minorities. As Freeman (1995) outlines: 
“Locke and Rousseau both located the problem of political authority in the relation 
between the individual and the state. Minorities in Locke’s theory and partial associations 
in Rousseau’s had no role in legitimate government” (25). 
Naturally, in a democracy the majority decides, but as a rights system this lack of recognition of 
minorities might have left these groups vulnerable in the international system of human rights. 
Furthermore, Freeman (1995) argues that individual rights advocates would argue that these groups are 
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protected by their individual rights. But if the individual’s right is being violated because of that 
person’s membership of a certain minority, it might be more practical to conceive the right protecting 
that individual as a group right. As Freeman (1995) states: 
“The individualistic, egalitarian form of democracy in ethnically plural societies may lead 
to the violation of the human rights of members of minority collectivities. The targets of 
many of the worst human rights violations since 1945 have been ethnic groups as 
such” (32). 
Here Freeman, of course, refers to genocides such as the ones in Rwanda and the Balkans. Conflicts 
that show the problematic situation of having various ethnicities within one state, instead of the perfect 
fit, imagined by Locke and Rousseau, where one state represents one nation. Collectivities do, of 
course, have a right to exist in the current international human rights framework, as “General Assembly 
Resolution 96 (I) declared genocide to be ‘a denial of the right of existence of entire human 
groups” (Freeman, 1995: 33). As Freeman (1995) adds, however, “…if groups have the right to exist, 
they surely have the right to be protected from economic and cultural destruction” (33). 
This dichotomy in rights between the collective rights of peoples and the individual human rights goes 
along the lines of Donnelly’s writings on collective and individual rights. Accordingly, “with the 
exception of the right to self-determination … all the rights in the Universal Declaration and the 
Covenants are the rights of individuals (Donnelly, 2013: 29). Donnelly (2013), who can hardly be said 
to be a supporter of collective human rights, states that the individual rights to nondiscrimination and 
freedom of association and participation protect an individual person’s right to be a member of a certain 
group. In extension, he argues that:  
“Individual rights approaches to group difference rest on the idea that group affiliations – other 
than membership of the species Homo Sapiens – ought to be irrelevant to the rights and 
opportunities available to human beings” (Donnelly, 2013: 46). 
However, if the goal of human rights is a life in dignity, then humans are naturally social beings that 
need social interaction and require a sense of belonging to group identity. Some might say that human 
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rights cannot be adequate until they absorb the social aspect of human beings as well. Even though 
some analysts, as Donnelly, say that groups rights cannot be human rights, others: 
“…insist that human rights can take collective as well as individual form. They argue that 
much of what is fundamentally important to human beings relates to ‘goods’ and ‘bads’ that 
people experience collectively, rather that individually: If we insist that human rights must be 
rights that people can hold only as independent individuals, our conception of human rights 
will not match the social reality of the human condition” (Jones, 1999: 80-81). 
 Furthermore, if we take a step back from human rights for a while, there are, of course, many rights 
that are formulated in terms of group rights, besides a people’s right to self-determination. One 
example is found when, within a national context, certain ethnic groups are given special representation 
in government. This happens, for instance, in Belgium where different linguistic communities have 
rights granted especially to them in the Constitution (Van Dyke, 1977: 353). Another example is found 
in the civil rights era in the United States in the 60s and 70s and its use of affirmative action to 
overcome discrimination of certain minorities (Ingram, 2014: 286). And, even though it might not be 
the best argument for ascribing moral standing to groups, another example can be found in how the 
British dealt with the politics of balancing different ethnic communities in their former colonies:  
“In Tanganyika, for example, they thought in terms of three communities: European, Asian, 
and African – 1948 numbering 11,000, 57,000, and 7 million, respectively. A British 
commission charged with recommending a system of representation at the end of World War II 
apparently did not even think of assuming that what should be represented were individual 
inhabitants. Instead, it thought in terms of the ‘claims of the communities’ and the relative 
importance of those claims” (Van Dyke, 1977: 353). 
The question then is: Why are group human rights contested. Much of the hostility boils down to the 
different understandings of the nature of rights. To some scholars the question of whether something is 
a right or not, is answered by “…human rights are whatever the relevant international authority says 
they are” (Jones, 1999: 83). Donnelly (2013), for example, puts a lot of emphasis on international legal 
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universality and less on the nature of rights, and states that: “Human rights are less about the way 
people are than about what they might become. They are about moral rather than natural or juridical 
persons” (15). Thereby, he stresses the moral aspect of human rights as international agreed upon 
guidelines for the betterment of the human condition. This thinking leads him to state: “For the 
purposes of international action, ‘human rights’ means roughly ‘what is in the Universal 
Declaration’” (Donnelly, 2013: 24). 
To other scholars, however, the nature of rights is an important question to deal with and these scholars 
can be divided into two competing views: The choice conception and the interest conception. 
Generally, rights are explained in the following way: ‘A has a right to x (with respect to B) specifies a 
right-holder (A), an object of the right (x), and duty-bearer (B)” (Donnelly, 2013: 8). Or in other words 
A has a right to x and B has an obligation to respect and not violate A’s right to x. What the two 
conceptions then deal with, is the nature of the right x or, to put it differently, the justification of the 
right to x. Freeman (1995) outlines the two competing conceptions: 
“The interest conception of rights is said to hold that the grounds of rights are the interests of 
the rights-holders, whereas the choice conception maintains that a right exist when the 
necessary and sufficient condition of imposing or relaxing the constraint on the duty-bearer is 
the right-holder’s choice to his effect” (29). 
Among the scholars who ascribe to the interest conception is Joseph Raz, who defines a right in the 
following terms: “’X has a right’ if and only if X can have rights, and, other things being equal, an 
aspect of X’s well-being (his interest) is a sufficient reason for holding some other person(s) to be 
under a duty” (Jones, 1999: 83). Rights and duties, then, are interconnected in the sense that the interest 
of X in having a right has to be great enough to justify imposing obligations on a duty-bearer. The 
interest conception, however, has been criticized by scholars adhering to the choice conception. Hillel 
Steiner, for example, has argued that: 
“…since interests can conflict, the interest conception entails conflicts of rights. If rights 
conflict, so do their correlative duties. And if duty-bearers have conflicting duties, they cannot 
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carry out all their duties. Those duties that they cannot carry out cannot really be duties. So 
their correlative rights cannot really be rights” (Freeman, 1995: 29). 
Freeman (1995) criticizes this stance, though. He agrees that interest can conflict, meaning that rights 
can also conflict. He argues, however, that a conflicting right is not as big a problem as Steiner makes it 
out to be, and rather merely entails duties to balance rights. As an example of this, he imagines a 
government that has to balance rights: “A government that discharges its duty to protect the right to 
privacy by limiting the right to freedom of speech is not violating its duty to respect the right to 
freedom of speech but fulfilling its duty to balance these rights” (29). To this he adds: 
“Conflicts of rights, with their consequent indeterminacy, are, however stubborn facts of 
human-rights politics. Steiner’s attempt to sacrifice the interest conception for the sake of 
complete logical coherence is to accord priority to logic over (moral and political) 
experience” (Freeman, 1995: 30). 
The interest conception provides arguments in support for group rights. If the justification of a right to 
something is that the interest in enjoying this right must be great enough to impose duties on the duty-
bearer, then the combined interest of a collective, or a group, must make this interest greater compared 
to the correlative duty to be imposed on the duty-bearer. Accordingly, Jones (1999) outlines the formal 
conditions that Joseph Raz lays down for a group right: 
“First, it exists because an aspect of the interest of human beings justifies holding some 
person(s) to be subject to a duty. Second, the interests in question are the interests of 
individuals as members of a group in a public good and the right is a right to that public good 
because it serves their interest as members of the group. Thirdly, the interest of no single 
member of that group in that public good is sufficient by itself to justify holding another person 
to be subject to a duty” (84). 
In order to explicate this, Jones (1999) imagines an example of a factory giving off polluting fumes 
which are affecting the neighbors living in the surrounding area. He asks himself whether these 
neighbors have a right to stop the factory from polluting. He imagines then that the fumes are affecting 
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the neighbors’ quality of life, but it is not a risk to any individual’s health. Furthermore, the costs of 
stopping the polluting activity are great, as it will be financially expensive for the company and some 
workers might lose their jobs. Confronted with these costs, he argues that no interest of a single 
individual living in vicinity to the factory is great enough to impose a duty on the factory to stop its 
polluting activity. He concludes, however, that if consider the aggregate interest of all the individuals in 
the vicinity, then that may be sufficient to impose correlative duties. This, then, would be a group right, 
because jointly the vicinity possess a right that they did not possess individually (84). 
If the interest conception gives reason to the statement that groups can have rights that begs the 
question as to which groups should be entitled to have rights. Jack Donnelly, who as mentioned is not a 
supporter of collective rights, asks his readers the provocative question: “Consider, for example, states, 
multinational corporations, gangs, and barbershop quartets” (Donnelly, 2013: 49). Just as individual 
rights reflect moral values that grounds human rights, naturally group rights should also be morally 
grounded as a way of guaranteeing human dignity. Logically, gang should have no moral standing to 
deserve group rights. Furthermore, as in the case of affirmative action, groups that historically have 
been discriminated against might be entitled to group rights to overcome that discrimination. This, of 
course, could lead to a watering out of human rights and to a situation where: “Pretty much everyone 
except prosperous white Western males – and many of them as well – would have group 
rights” (Donnelly, 2013: 50). Ingram (2014), however, states that: “In particular, groups whose 
members are intolerant of outsiders and espouse racist, sexist, and ethno-centrist views are less 
deserving of group rights protection” (286). The reflections of the political reality on this issue does, 
nonetheless, not always make a lot of sense. Ingram (2014) compares to religious institutions:  
“Why Should Bob Jones University in Greenville, South Carolina, lose its tax-exempt status as 
a religious institution of higher learning by prohibiting interracial dating while the Catholic 
Church, which bans women from becoming priests, retain it?” (286). 
Donnelly (2013) does, however, make one possible exception in his rejection of group rights. He argues 
that indigenous peoples probably present an exception to the individual rights approach. He does, 
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nonetheless, not make a big effort in defending this possible exception. Furthermore, he argues that 
these rights “should be seen as individual rights of members of indigenous communities” (52). 
Nonetheless, he states: 
“If indigenous communities are more or less globally subject to threats to their autonomy, 
equality, and dignity and if those threats cannot be countered by existing rights to 
nondiscrimination and freedom of association, then it may make sense to recognize 
international human rights of indigenous peoples” (Donnelly, 2013: 51-52). 
Which groups should have rights is not an easy question to answer, but then again does the fact that 
something is difficult to determine mean that something should not be a right? As discussed earlier, are 
human rights supposed to be determinate entities that are easy to put in affect or are they supposed to 
reflect what we think is morally right? Obviously, the latter seems to be the preferable.   
4.3. Collective rights and corporate rights 
A central question when talking about group rights is whether these are reducible to individual rights or 
whether the group as an entity has a moral standing of its own. Some scholars argue for the former 
understanding, while others argue for the latter. At the epicenter of this discussion is the question: If 
one recognizes collective human rights, then, where does this leave individual human rights and what 
should the relation between the two be?  
In the, above-mentioned, example of the vicinity to a polluting factory, the interest conception allowed 
for a group of people to have a right collectively, since their aggregated interest could be sufficient to 
place obligations to respect that right on a duty-bearer. This was, then, a right that they might not have 
had as individual rights holders, since the interest of one individual might not suffice to put obligations 
on same duty-bearer. Jones (1999) makes a distinction, here, between two ways of understanding group 
rights, the collective rights and corporate rights conceptions. The collective rights conception is 
represented by the example of the vicinity to the factory. In this example “…a group right is a right 
held jointly by those who make up the group” (85) and “…the group qua group has no standing that is 
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not reducible to the moral standing of its members” (85). In the corporate conception, however, the 
group right is not reducible to the moral standing of the group’s individual members, but rather the 
group has a moral standing of its own: 
“Thus, under the corporate conception, the holder of the right is the group conceived as a 
single, integral entity. Morally, the group might be said to constitute a right-bearing 
“individual.” The right is held not jointly by the several individuals who make up the group, 
but by the group as a unitary entity: The right is ‘its’ rather than ‘their’ right” (Jones, 1999: 86). 
Such corporately conceived rights do, naturally, exist. Legal corporations hold such rights (Freeman, 
1999: 87). An example from a US Supreme Court verdict also comes to mind. When, in the case of 
Citizen United v. Federal Election Commission, the Supreme Court ruled against the limits on large 
donations in election campaigns with the argument that it was a violation of corporations’ right to free 
speech. Freeman (1999), however, warns that such corporate rights cannot be human rights, because 
“…they are rights held by corporate entities rather than by human beings. They are also grounded in 
whatever gives those corporate entities their special moral status rather than rights grounded in the 
status of humanity or personhood” (88).  
Van Dyke (1977) makes the same distinction about group rights conceptions, only he talks about them 
as derivative or intrinsic: “A group right is derivative if it is delegated by one or more original holders 
of the right … it is intrinsic if it is aboriginal to the group” (345). Van Dyke, unlike Freeman, argues 
that intrinsic group rights can indeed, and should be, human rights. Specifically, he argues for 
attributing to ethnic minorities the same rights as those that are afforded to peoples, when referring to 
nation states. In the above-mentioned example of the British commission dividing the system of 
representation in Tanganyika between three ethnic communities, Van Dyke (1977) argues that “[i]t is 
difficult to see how the community rights can be reduced to individual rights” (352). Though some 
would still argue that these could be reduced to individual rights of the members of a particular 
community, Van Dyke (1977) sees it as closer to the system of representation between states in 
international politics: 
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“Between states, regardless of their size, the problem of representation is solved by the parity 
rule: one state – one vote. The British simply treated the communities of Tanganyika like 
states” (353). 
Similarly, Van Dyke (1977) is not convinced by the argument that affirmative action policies could be 
reduced to individual rights: “An individualist interpretation of equal protection provides a 
questionable basis for affirmative action – for example, when benefits go to persons who have not 
suffered discrimination themselves” (356). Both Freeman and Van Dyke find it more logical to see a 
people’s right to self-determination as a group right. To Freeman, however, this right must be conceived 
as reducible to the individual rights holders, in this instance the citizens of that particular state. As he 
sees it corporate units cannot hold moral rights, since these are then held by the group as a unit, and not 
the individual human being. Van Dyke (1977), nonetheless, finds that a strong argument can be made 
“...that self-determination is the right of a group, of a corporate unit” (358). To this end, he highlights 
how former US president Woodrow Wilson’s statement “…was not that every person but that every 
people has a right to choose the sovereignty under which to live” (Van Dyke, 1977: 358). Furthermore, 
he stresses how: 
“…in 1975 the General Assembly adopted a resolution calling for measures ‘to enable the 
Palestinian people to exercise its inalienable national rights…A just collective claim is here 
assumed” (Van Dyke, 1977: 358). 
As was discussed above, the classical liberal scholars, such as Locke and Rousseau, gave little attention 
to the status and rights of minorities. Instead, these scholars took the nation state to a homogeneous 
unit, where nation and state overlaps. In today’s world, it is highly accepted that few nation states, if 
any, are completely homogeneous in terms of ethnic communities. Van Dyke (1977) stresses how “[t]he 
tendency to think of states as if they were nation-sates is highly misleading, for scarcely a state 
qualifies for this label. This can be seen, for example, in the instance of the linguistic communities in 
Belgium. Van Dyke, then, advances the argument that “[a] doctrine accepting both individuals and 
communities as right-and-duty-bearing units is susceptible to universal application, whereas a doctrine 
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focusing on individuals is not” (367). Which leads him to advance the argument that ethnic 
communities should also have moral rights, or in other words, human rights: 
“If communities as well as individuals were accepted as right-and-duty-bearing units, there 
would be consequences for both justice and peace. In principle, the granting of status and rights 
to ethnic communities on an intermediate basis should extend justice by giving minorities their 
due and reducing the discrimination and oppression to which they are commonly 
subjected” (Van Dyke, 1977: 367). 
In the epicenter of the rejection of group human rights is the fear that these will come to violate 
individual human rights. These arguments center, principally, around questions of autonomy and the 
right to exit from a group, or in other words how group rights position individual right-holders 
internally in the group. Furthermore, the external aspect of how individual-holders without group rights 
are positioned. 
Dealing first with the latter, the external dimension, there is a fear among liberal theorists that group 
rights might override individual rights. As an example of this, affirmative action and positive 
discrimination “…accord priority to collective rights of favoured groups over individual rights to 
equality of opportunity of those who are not members of these groups” (Freeman, 1995: 33) and the 
same goes for rights to special representation in government (Freeman, 1995: 33). Furthermore, 
dictatorships and repressive regimes have often used the common good to justify individual human 
rights violations. Freeman (1995) draws attention to the problem of assigning rights to peoples: 
“Recent proposals for the recognition of peoples’ rights to development, peace, a satisfactory 
environment, etc., are undoubtedly aimed at protecting important human interests, but they also 
raise several conceptual problems: the subject of the rights is uncertain; potential conflicts 
between peoples’ rights and individual rights are not addressed; and the holders and the nature 
of the correlative duties are unclear. The formulation of these rights may have the merit of 
drawing attention to the structural dimensions of human rights violations, but it is conceptually 
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unsatisfactory and potentially dangerous insofar as it encourages states to violate individual 
human rights in the name of people’s rights” (34). 
As regards the internal aspect of group rights confronted with the individual rights of its members, the 
main concerns are the right to autonomy of the individual member and an effective right to exit the 
group. Freeman (1995) stresses that, though communities are necessary to live good individual lives, 
individuals must have autonomy to choose their specific form of the good life (34). He justifies this on 
the grounds that communities can be oppressive: 
“Individuals should have autonomy (i.e., the right to choose) because communities can be oppressive. 
Communities are also often stratified. Individuals who are required to conform to the community are 
required to conform to the wills of those with the most power in the community” (Freeman, 1995: 34). 
Part of this right to autonomy of the individual members of a group is an effective right to exit if one 
wishes. This then comes down to a discussion of how much information and what information is 
necessary to provide in order for an effective right to exit. Groups, naturally, have an interest in 
extending its values and belief system to its individual members. Nonetheless, the right to exit depends 
on the group making this a viable option for the individual (Ingram, 2014: 287). It is a difficult 
balancing act, however:  
“Communities are likely to emphasize the right of the community to socialize its members into 
its values. Liberals may well hold that education for autonomy is necessary for an effective 
right to exit. Liberal theory generates a dilemma because it endorses collective and individual 
rights here that may be mutually incompatible” (Freeman, 1995: 36).  
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5. ANALYSIS 
In this principal part of the paper I shall apply the discussion on individual and group rights theory to 
the cases of IACHRs documents on the Western Shoshone case and the case of the Guaraní people. 
However, before I start the analysis I shall do some reflection on the general role of the IACHR in the 
Inter-American system of human rights held against the relativity or universality of human rights in 
general. In addition to this, I shall look at indigenous perceptions of land ownership, specifically the 
perceptions of the Western Shoshone and the Guarani peoples. Dealing first with the general role of the 
IACHR, Barelli (2010) states that the regional systems play the role of making the universal human 
rights fit the regional system and thereby they: 
”Manage to take into account the cultural and political traditions of the concerned region, 
offering a railroad constructive response to the human rights problems arising within their geographical 
area of activity” (960). 
If this is the case, a certain degree of relativity must certainly be ascribed to the universal human rights 
framework, once applied regionally. Some of the hardliner universalists might have a problem with this 
cultural adaptation of universal rights. Donnelly, for one, seems to accept that some relativity enters the 
scene at the point of implementing human rights within the nation state. He is, however, not fond of 
cultural relativity, since there should be no differentiation between the members of the species Homo 
Sapiens, in which Donnelly grounds the universality of human rights. 
Furthermore, one might question if a regional system represents a unified culture, a type of political 
tradition. Within the European human rights system, one might ask if Ukraine is not closer to Russia in 
cultural and political traditions, than they are to France or Germany. Also, as regards the two cases of 
this study, one could wonder if the United States of America and Bolivia can be represented as having 
the same cultural and political traditions. Perhaps the US is closer to England, through the Anglo-Saxon 
political and cultural tradition, than they are to Bolivia. 
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A further general consideration should be presented before boarding the specific analyses of the cases. 
Having looked through the online database of the IACHRs official documents, I found a curious 
discovery. In total, the IACHR have done 63 country reports since 1962. Every single one of these has 
been done on countries in Latin America. Not once has the IACHR done a country report on neither 
Canada nor the United States. Furthermore, 6 of these have been on Cuba, which seems a high number 
considering the total number of country reports. Furthermore, Cuba is not even a member of the 
Organization of American States (OAS), since they were excluded in 1962. 
Considering this, one comes to wonder about Mutua’s savior-victim metaphor. As he criticized Western 
institutions for focusing only on the Third World. However, one would also expect more human rights 
violations in less stable political institutions, such as those seen in some Latin American countries.  
One can question why the IACHR has kept doing reports on Cuba, since they supposedly should be 
doing reports on OAS member states. Still, one cannot question the scrutinizing of Cuba, since after all 
Cuba has been a dictatorship for over 50 years. Furthermore, not all Latin American countries are being 
submitted to observations and filings of country reports. Costa Rica, which in terms of political 
stability and quality of democracy might be seen as closer to the United States, then say, for example, 
Venezuela or Guatemala. 
Secondly, I shall look at indigenous perceptions of land ownership and their relationship with their 
ancestral territories. The issue of indigenous peoples’ property rights is at the epicenter of the universal-
relative discussion. The question is whether a group specific approach can be applied to indigenous 
peoples without jeopardizing the universality of human rights. It seems to me that human rights must 
deal with relevant issues facing humanity. Territory has a special meaning to indigenous peoples and 
several NGOs have defended this perspective as necessary for a life in dignity of these peoples.  
An extreme example of this is found in a report by the International NGO Survival International, an 
organization working for the rights of indigenous peoples, submitted to the UN Commission on the 
Elimination of Racial Discrimination. The report reflects on the situation of the Guarani of Mato 
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Grosso do Sul in Brazil, who have seen an encroachment of their ancestral territories by cattle ranchers 
and sugar cane plantations. The results of the threat to the traditional Guarani way of life are severe: 
“Profoundly affected by their huge loss of land the Guarani of Mato Grosso do Sul suffer a 
wave of suicide unequalled in South America. They also suffer from high rates of unfair 
imprisonment, exploitation in the work place, malnutrition, violence, homicide and 
assassinations” (Survival International, 2010: 5). 
To make clear the link between the right to property over ancestral lands and the right to life, one might 
make a comparison with another case where the loss of property led to suicide. This is not to state that 
the other case is necessarily a human rights issue. Furthermore, since does not have to do with 
indigenous peoples whether or not it is a human rights matter, is not relevant to this study. Nonetheless, 
one of the products of the economic crisis in Spain was a wave of suicides. In 2012, at least 20 people 
committed suicide as result of being close to being evicted from their homes, due to a lack of resources 
to pay back their mortgages (Hector, 2013).  
The loss of property leading to suicide is the same relation in the two cases. However, it is quite 
probable that the suicides in the Spanish case could have been avoided, had another home been 
provided for them. This may not be the case of the indigenous peoples’ relation to their ancestral 
territories. This comparison is made to stress that the special relationship indigenous peoples have with 
their lands goes beyond the traditional conception of owning property.  
As Campbell-Duruflé (2009) states, “indigenous peoples’ right to territory, then, is inseparable from its 
cultural, economical and political dimensions” (67) . Furthermore, Campbell-Duruflé ties the right of 2
indigenous peoples to their ancestral lands up with the indivisibility of human rights: 
 Translated from Spanish. Original wording was: “El Derecho al territorio de los pueblos indígenas, entonces, es 2
inseparable de sus dimensiones culturales, económicas y políticas”.
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“The [American] continents’ indigenous peoples’ right to their lands is a indispensable 
prerequisite for the enjoyment by these peoples and their members of other fundamental rights, 
just as their particular origin illustrates” (66) . 3
Important to this discussion of relativity and universality is, of course, the indigenous perspectives on 
their relationship with the land. To the Western Shoshone their land is connected to their creation 
stories. They call the land Newe Sogobia, meaning “Peoples’ Earth Mother” in their native tongue. The 
call themselves Newe, meaning “People”. According to their creation story, the Newe were placed on 
this land and responsible for taking care of it through their songs and prayers. This responsibly extends 
to future generations of all peoples and all life. (Fishel, 2006/2007: 622). According to their traditions 
and costumes, the relationship that they have with the land is of a different nature than property in the 
Western, or European, understanding: 
“The Newe see the earth as a female living being. The Western European system sees the earth 
as a resource for human consumption and domination. According to Western Shoshone 
traditional teachings, the issue of “ownership” or “title” is much different. For the Newe, the 
Creator, or “Apa,” holds title to the lands. People do not have a dominating relationship with 
the land, but rather have responsibilities to protect the land areas from which they originate. 
Therefore, for the Shoshone, indigenous rights mean having the right to access, use and pray 
for the land in their own way and the right to decision-making over activities that affect the 
land and its resources” (Fishel, 2006/2007: 622-623). 
The Guarani people who occupy a vast area of the Bolivian Chaco moved into this region, before the 
arrival of the Spaniards, when seeking the Ìvì Maräì – Land without trouble (Staller, 2008: 161). 
Similar to the Western Shoshone in the United States, the Guarani people living in the lowlands of the 
Gran Chaco has a more holistic relationship with the land they live on, than what is the normal relation 
in the Western concept of property rights over a territory: 
 Translated from Spanish. Original wording was: “El derecho a la tierra de los pueblos indígenas del continente es un 3
prerrequisito indispensable para el goce de los otros derechos fundamentales de esos pueblos y de sus miembros, justo como 
lo ilustra su origen particular”.
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“The concept territory already sums up the most important aspects of the lowland Indians’ use 
of resources. The concept entails not only the soil as a base for production, but the totality of 
the ecosystem. Forest, animals and human beings make up an environment, that is interactive, 
alive and “humanized”. Just like in the highlands, in the world view of the inhabitants of the 
lowlands, the human being is nothing more than a part of the territory and not its owner or 
lord” (Stosch, 2014: 29) . 4
It seems almost too obvious to state that these are representations of a collective conception to the right 
to territory. Nonetheless, this is the case in both the world view of the Western Shoshone and the 
Guarani. These world views do not, of course, give any hints as to whether or not these are perceived as 
human rights. If anything, they expand beyond human rights to include the right of all living things to 
make use of the environment in which they are living.  
As it was discussed in the theory section, many universalists see the right to exit as the Achilles heel of 
the collectively conceived rights, since these could then trump individual rights. These world views do 
not outline the status of the right to exit. Naturally, however, if one were to exit, one could not bring 
with him his share of the collective territory. First of all, because either a right to territory is 
collectively owned or it is divided out among individual rights holders. The two systems do not mix. 
Secondly, as is outlined above, these indigenous people do not even perceive the right of humans to 
own territory. They just live in it, among other living beings, with the right to make use of the 
environment. 
I shall now go into the analysis of the two specific cases, the Western Shoshone peoples in the United 
States of America and the Guarani peoples in Bolivia, that are going to be studied comparatively in 
what follows in the remainder of this analysis. Hence, below the analysis is divided into two 
subsections. Each covers one of the two cases. 
 Translated from Spanish. Original wording was: “el término territorio resume ya los aspectos más importantes del 4
aprovechamiento de recursos de los indígenas de tierras bajas. El término comprende no sólo el suelo como base productiva 
sino la totalidad del ecosistema. Bosque, animales y seres humanos forman un entorno interactivo vivo y “humanizado”. Al 
igual que en tierras altas, en la cosmovisión de los habitantes de tierras bajas, el ser humano no es más que una parte del 
territorio y no su amo y señor”.
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5.1. The Western Shoshone – The case of Mary and Carrie Dann v. the 
United States of America  
“In my lifetime, I know people who were taken from their homes as children and forced into boarding 
schools where their identity as an Indian person was beaten and shamed out of them”. 
- Carrie Dann (Fishel, 2006/2007: 619) 
  
The dichotomy between individual and collective human rights are at the centre of this case, with the 
petitioners on one side, and backed in these claims by the IACHR, claiming their collective property 
rights to their ancestral lands and the United States government rejecting that such collective property 
rights can be human rights. The petitioners specify their continued use of the territory: 
“According to the petition, the Danns together with other members of their extended family in 
the Dann band occupy, hunt graze and otherwise use lands (the ‘Dann lands’) that are within 
the larger ancestral territory of the Western Shoshone people. This ancestral territory is alleged 
to encompass not only the ranch upon which the Danns live but rangelands and other property 
principally in the state of Nevada (the ‘Western Shoshone ancestral lands’)” (IACHR, 2002: 
point 36). 
As it was outlined in the introduction, the Western Shoshone nation signed a peace treaty with the 
United States in 1963 and the petitioners claim that the relations between the Western Shoshone and the 
United States are still regulated by this treaty (IACHR, 2002: point 37). Thus, to the Danns the matter 
at stake is the recognition of their right to continued use of their ancestral lands as members of the 
Western Shoshone people. Furthermore, the Danns claim that their use of the land has been of a nature 
common to that of indigenous people: 
“In terms of the relation of the Western Shoshone to their ancestral lands, the petitioners have 
contended the existence of a system of aboriginal land title that has historically been communal 
in nature and based upon land and resource use patterns” (IACHR, 2002: point 103). 
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The Commission outlines the positions of the two parties and specifies the points upon which the 
Danns and the U.S. Government agree. Both parties agree that “the Western Shoshone ‘people’ or 
‘nation’ constitutes a collective of individuals of native descent who have traditionally occupied the 
vast and arid territory of approximately 24,000,000 acres that is now primarily the state of Nevada in 
the United States” (point 100). Furthermore, both sides agree that the Western Shoshone have at some 
point had title to this territory as their ancestral lands (IACHR, 2002: point 100). However, the parties 
also agree on the fact that “the Dann band is not among the federally-chartered Western Shoshone 
tribes with which the United States government maintains official relations” (IACHR, 2002: point 
104). Nonetheless: 
“There appears to be no dispute, however, that the Dann band, and the Dann sisters themselves, 
are considered a part of the Western Shoshone people who have traditionally occupied a 
particular region of the Western Shoshone ancestral territory, and as such share in the history 
and status of the Western Shoshone as an aboriginal people” (IACHR, 2002: point 104). 
Consequently, what is clear in the position of the United States is not that they do not recognize the 
Danns as indigenous people and part of the Western Shoshone nation, nor that the Western Shoshone 
have at some point had title to and collective ownership over the lands in question. Rather, the State’s 
objection to the Danns claim, that the government has violated their right to property under Article 23 
of the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, boils down to two things. First, the State 
claims that the Western Shoshone’s title to the lands were settled through the ICC, who deemed the 
Western Shoshone title to be extinct due to encroachment by non-indigenous settlers and a 
compensation of $26 million was to be paid to the Western Shoshone. Secondly, the State does not 
recognize the collective human rights of indigenous peoples. 
The Commission’ arguments to these two point show how the Commission sees the American 
Declaration as a living document that follows international normative developments. Regarding the 
first point, the Commission recognizes that through the ICC the United States has sought to solve the 
problem of indigenous ancestral lands (IACHR, 2002: point 138). It, however, also criticizes the 
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procedure of the ICC and what this meant for the Dann band. The ICC dealt with the Temoak Band, on 
behalf of all Western Shoshone people in the negotiation over all of the 24,000,000 acres of land 
(IACHR, 2002: point 115). However, when a group of Western Shoshone including the Danns tried to 
intervene stating that they were still using their part of the land, and therefore the collective title of the 
Western Shoshone was not extinct, they were not allowed to get involved in the process (IACHR, 2002: 
point 117). Moreover, the ICC Act specified that once a claim had been determined by the ICC, that 
“forever discharges the United States and bars any other claim arising out of the matter involved in the 
controversy” (IACHR, 2002: point 111) and furthermore, the ICC Act “…limited the relief that could 
be ordered by the ICC to that which was compensable in money and did not include recovery of land 
where that would be plausible” (IACHR, 2002: point 112) 
The Commission stresses that it is not its task to determine whether the Danns in fact have a right to 
property in the Western Shoshone ancestral lands (171). It does, nonetheless, contend that the Danns 
have not been afforded an opportunity to “…play a full or effective role in retaining, authorizing or 
instructing the Western Shoshone claimants in the ICC process” (IACHR, 2002: point 136). And it is 
on this background that the Commission argues that the United States has violated the Danns’ human 
right to property, since: 
“The Commission first considers that Articles XVIII and XXIII of the American Declaration 
specifically oblige a member state to ensure that any determination of the extent to which 
indigenous claimants maintain interest in the lands to which they have traditionally held title 
and have occupied and used is based upon a process of fully informed and mutual consent on 
the part of the indigenous community as a whole” (IACHR, 2002: point 140). 
Regarding the second point of the United States government, the polarized arguments between the state 
on one side and the petitioners, backed by the Commission, on the other, clearly reflects the individual-
collective rights debate. The United States argues that this is not a matter of collective property, but 
rather an issue regarding individual permits to graze on public lands. They refer to the individual 
property of the Dann sisters’ father and how after his death his daughters began grazing a greater 
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number than permitted on public lands (IACHR, 2002: point 78). Furthermore, the state contends that 
the Danns “…might have been able to claim rights to some lands by asserting a theory of individual 
rights” (IACHR, 2002: point 92). To the accusation of having violated the Danns property rights under 
the American Declaration, the State contends: 
“Specifically with the respect to the petitioners’ allegation that the United States is responsible 
for a violation of the right to property under Article XXIII of the American Declaration, the 
State contends that this provision of the Declaration is concerned with the rights of an 
individual and not of a separate government entity such as an Indian tribe” (IACHR, 2002: 
point 93). 
As a response to this, the Commission refers to normative developments in the international human 
rights regime as regards indigenous peoples’ collective human right to their ancestral territories: 
“…the Commission and other international authorities have recognized the collective aspect of 
indigenous rights, in the sense of the rights that are realized in part or in whole through their 
guarantee to groups or organizations of people and this recognition has extended to 
acknowledgement of a particular connection between communities of indigenous peoples and 
the lands and resources that they have traditionally occupied and used, the preservation of 
which is fundamental to the effective realization of the human rights of indigenous peoples 
more generally and therefore warrants special measures of protection” (IACHR, 2002: point 
128). 
Thus, the IACHR argues that indigenous peoples have collective human rights to the lands they have 
traditionally occupied and used. Furthermore, as it was outlined above, this right to the lands are still in 
place even though they have no legal title, or lost possession of these lands due to encroachment by 
non-indigenous peoples, since they maintain the right to be involved in the process of determining what 
is to be of these lands. This shows how according to the interpretation of the IACHR, indigenous 
peoples have moral group rights to their ancestral territories.  
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However, regarding other protection instruments, the State argues that “…the United States is not a 
party to the [American] Convention and is therefore not bound by it” (IACHR, 2002: point 94). “…the 
proposed American Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous People…has not been adopted” (IACHR, 
2002: point 94) and also object to the reference to the ILO Convention No. 169, which the United 
States have not ratified (IACHR, 2002: point 94). Nonetheless, from the IACHR’s interpretation of 
these international normative developments, the Commission recommends the following to the United 
States government: 
-       “Provide Mary and Carrie Dann with an effective remedy, which includes adopting 
the legislative or other measures necessary to ensure respect for the Danns’ right to 
property in accordance with Articles II, XVIII and XXIII of the American Declaration 
in connection with their claims to property rights in the Western Shoshone ancestral 
lands” (IACHR, 2002: point 173.1). 
-       “Review its laws, procedures and practices to ensure that the property rights of 
indigenous persons are determined in accordance with the rights established in the 
American Declaration, including Articles II, XVIII and XXIII of the 
Declaration” (IACHR, 2002: point 173.2). 
The United States, after the report was filed, shows its attitude towards the interpretations of the 
IACHR. As was mentioned in the introduction, the United States government sent armed federal agents 
to impound 225 head of cattle from the Danns’ ancestral lands. Furthermore, the United States’ 
response to the recommendations of the IACHR, shows in the clearest way possible that the US does 
not share the view of the IACHR regarding the collective human rights of indigenous peoples: 
“In its response, the United States also reiterated its position that the Danns’ claim ‘is 
fundamentally, not a human rights claim, but an attempt by two individual Indians to reopen 
the question of collective Western Shoshone tribal property rights to land – a question that has 
been litigated to finality in the U.S. courts.’ Based upon these submissions, the United States 
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stated that it ‘respectfully declines to take any further actions to comply with the Commission’s 
recommendations.’” (IACHR, 2002: Point 176). 
To sum up, the IACHR argues in this case that indigenous people have collective rights to the 
territories they have traditionally occupied and used. This is the case even if they do not have legal title 
to their lands. Thus, in the case of Mary and Carrie Dann, the IACHR concludes that the Dann Band 
has a right to be involved in the process by playing a full or effective role in retaining, authorizing or 
instructing the Western Shoshone claimants in the ICC process. This interpretation is reached by 
looking at the property rights of American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man in the context 
of more recent recognition at the regional and international level of indigenous peoples right to their 
ancestral territories. The United States response, of respectfully declining to follow the 
recommendations of the IACHR, reflects well the dichotomy between individual and group human 
rights. While the IACHR’s interpretation is closer to the group-specific indigenous perception of 
property rights, the United States government positions itself closer to the individualist conception of 
property rights. 
5.2. Captive Communities: Situation of the Guarani Indigenous Peoples and 
Contemporary Forms of Slavery in the Bolivian Chaco 
“The work that we are doing, at times they don’t pay us for it, or they don’t pay us well, and they treat 
us like animals. They tell us that we are animals but they give the animals 5 hectares per head of 
cattle….There are laws for the cows, but there are no laws for us”. 
- Guaraní testimony (IACHR, 2008: 28). 
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As mentioned in the introduction the IACHR have done two country reports on Bolivia, in 2007 and 
2009 respectively. In these reports I shall focus on and analyze the parts of them that deals with the 
human rights situation of the Guarani indigenous people. Furthermore, in between the two other 
reports, in 2008, the Commission did a special observation visit on the situation of the Guarani 
indigenous people and contemporary forms of slavery in the Bolivian Chaco. I shall analyze the reports 
chronologically. 
Consequently, I shall start with the analysis of the 2007 country report. The first interesting aspect that 
one stumbles on upon reading the section on the rights of indigenous peoples in Bolivia, is the fact that 
these are grouped together with the rights of peasant communities. Something that at the first glance 
seems to suggest that IACHR does not recognize any special characteristic of indigenous peoples to 
merit a section of their own. It seems to suggest that the IACHRs interpretation of the human rights of 
indigenous peoples goes along the lines of Donnelly interpretation of human rights as a protective 
mechanism against the threats of modernization, nation states and the market. This interpretation leads 
into a thinking that the two groups share threats as individual rights holders and therefore can be 
grouped together. This is not the case, however. The IACHR specifies in the beginning of the section 
that grouping indigenous peoples together does not “imply any assimilation between these two 
categories which, both domestically and internationally, are differentiated” (IACHR, 2007: 59). Rather 
this grouping together of the two groups is done for methodological reasons as they share the similar or 
closely related issues (IACHR, 2007: 59). Furthermore, the Commission specifies that they know, and 
reiterate, that the “criterion of self-determination is the principal one for determining the condition of 
indigenous peoples” (IACHR, 2007: 59). 
I shall now go into the specific analysis of the first report from 2007. All through the section on 
indigenous peoples, the Commission reiterates the importance of recognizing indigenous peoples right 
to their ancestral lands. It praises the Bolivian government for having incorporated the ILO convention 
169 through Article 171 of the Bolivian Constitution which recognizes the special status of indigenous 
peoples “…with particular stress on community lands” (IACHR, 2007: 60). Nevertheless, the 
Commission notes the precarious situation of indigenous peoples “…with respect to access to land and 
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territory that are theirs by right of their ancestral use or occupancy…” (IACHR, 2007: 62). The IACHR 
backs this up by citing precedence in the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, which: 
“…has held that ‘by refusing to recognize the ancestral right of members of indigenous 
communities to their territories, other basic rights could be affected, such as the right to cultural 
identity and survival of indigenous communities and their members. It has also observed that 
‘on the contrary, the restriction on the individual right of private property could be necessary to 
achieve the collective goal of preserving cultural identities in a democratic and pluralistic 
society, within the meaning of the American Convention, and it could be proportionate, if 
payment of fair compensation is made to those who suffer losses…” (IACHR, 2007). 
Consequently, this shows clearly the group rights perspective that has been adopted by the IACHR and 
the IACrtHR in dealing with indigenous peoples’ rights. It shows the Inter-American system’s 
interpretation of the particular needs of indigenous peoples to live a life in dignity. As it was outlined in 
the theory section, Joseph Raz’ interest conception allows for the accumulated interest of a group to 
trump the individual right of a person outside the group. It seems clear that this is the justification 
behind the argumentation of the discourse in this document. Furthermore, it comes to show how the 
IACHR and the IACrtHR recognize that property rights, as understood to protect ancestral lands, 
incorporate a deeper conception than regular property rights: “…administrative procedure for handling 
land claims must take into account the specific aspects of indigenous peoples, in particular the special 
meaning that the land has for them” (IACHR, 2007: 65). In this document the IACHR also refers to the 
court to stress that indigenous peoples right to their ancestral territories is “…a collective right that, as 
the Inter-American court has held, is included in the right to property enshrined in Article 21 of the 
American Constitution” (IACHR, 2007: 66). 
In a subsection to the section on the rights of indigenous peoples and peasants in Bolivia, the IACHR 
deals with the specific case of Guarani peoples working under conditions analogous to slavery. In the 
Bolivian Chaco, the Commission deals with approximately 600 Guarani families working in relation of 
unpayable debt to the landowners. A debt that would at times be passed on to the next generation. 
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Furthermore, even corporal punishment, by whipping for disobedience, was reported. Here, the 
Commission could just have referred to the individual rights of the Guarani family members and let 
those individual rights serve as protection mechanisms to secure a life in dignity. The commission does 
refer to “..the absolute prohibition against slavery, bondage and forced labor contained in the American 
Convention” (IACHR, 2007: 73) and the “…UN Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of 
Slavery, the Slave Trade and Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery…” (IACHR, 2007: 73). 
However, the IACHR also ties the problem to the need for recognition of indigenous peoples’ right to 
their ancestral lands: 
“In the Commission’s view, the measures taken in this direction must include at least two 
perspectives. On the one hand, they must be designed to strengthen the process of recognition 
and registration of indigenous peoples’ ownership over their ancestral lands and territories; and 
on the other hand, they must eliminate any distortion of the labor and social rights of persons 
working in rural areas, including work on the land and the harvesting of products” (IACHR, 
2007: 75). 
I shall now move on to the 2008 report, which deals specifically with the Captive communities in the 
Chaco region. In this report, the IACHR deals exclusively with the issue of captive communities in the 
Bolivian Chaco. These 600 Guarani families live and work under conditions analogous to slavery. As 
mentioned in the introduction, these Guarani are kept in a situation of bondage trough an ever 
accumulating debt to the estate owner. In some instances, this debt would even be passed on to the next 
generation and in others the debt, along with the Guarani worker, would be taken over by another estate 
owner. Moreover, the Guarani people would at times be subjected to physical punishment. 
The Inter-American Commission attributes the roots of this issue to the historical inequality and 
discrimination of indigenous peoples in Bolivian society who even though they are the majority of the 
population, have remained outside the spheres of political and economic power due to discrimination in 
the political structures of the Bolivian State and society (IACHR, 2008: 9). Thus, the Commission sees 
the situation of the captive communities as an “…extreme manifestation of the discrimination that 
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indigenous peoples have suffered historically and continue to suffer in Bolivia” (IACHR, 2008: 3). 
Hence, the IACHR not only addresses the direct issue of slavery-like conditions, but also puts a great 
emphasis on the importance of ancestral lands: 
“The IACHR also considers it relevant to highlight the international provisions regarding 
property rights and access to justice for indigenous peoples, since the situation faced by the 
Guarani people in general and the captive communities in particular requires not only 
eradicating practices similar to slavery in this case, but also ensuring access to their ancestral 
territories to be able to develop and enjoy their own social, political, and legal institutions as 
well as their own vision of integral development” (IACHR, 2008: 18). 
For its analysis, the IACHR refers to the American Convention of Human rights, the United Nations 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples and the ILO Convention 169. Regarding the latter, the 
Commission finds Article 14 of the Convention especially relevant to the situation the captive Guaraní 
communities. The article establishes the duty of the state to take measures to: 
“…safeguard the right of the [Indigenous] peoples … to use lands not exclusively occupied by 
them, but to which they have the traditionally had access for their subsistence and traditional 
activities” (IACHR, 2008: 18). 
Regarding the issue of reparations for lost lands, Article 28 of the UNDRIP outlines that: 
“…reparations should be made by means of restitution; and in case the restitution of lands is 
not possible, there should he ‘fair and equitable compensation, for the lands, territories and 
resources which they have traditionally owned or otherwise occupied or used, and which have 
been confiscated, taken, occupied, used or damaged without their free, prior and informed 
consent” (IACHR, 2008: 18-19). 
In the case of the Dann sisters, the IACHR refers to the right to property enshrined in the American 
Declaration on the Right and Duties of man. In this case, the commission refers to the American 
Convention on Human rights and its Article 21 on the right to property, that since the 2001 ruling by 
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the IACrtHR in the case of Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community v. Nicaragua, has been 
interpreted in the Inter-American system to encompass the communal property rights of Indigenous 
Peoples to their ancestral territories: 
“The Inter-American Court of Human Rights has established that Article 21 of the American 
Convention (right to property) also protects ‘the rights of members of the indigenous 
communities within the framework of communal property,’ and recognizes that ‘[a]mong 
indigenous peoples there is a communitarian tradition regarding a communal form of collective 
property of the land, in the sense that ownership of the land is not centered on an individual but 
rather on the group and its community’” (IACHR, 2008: 20). 
This argumentation outlines the normative developments that has taken place in the Inter-American 
system. An individual right has come to protect a groups property right as well. This may be worrisome 
to hardliner universalists, who do not recognize that group rights can be human rights, because they are 
specific to that group and not universal to all human beings. Freeman argues that a corporate right, in 
which moral rights are placed on the group rather than derived from the individual rights holders, 
cannot be a human right. It seems illogical, however, to see this right, as it is outlined by the IACHR, to 
be derived from the individual indigenous persons’ individual property rights. Thus, this is not an 
equivalent to the example of the vicinity to the polluting factory, where the accumulated interests of the 
individual rights-holders could put correlative duties on the factory. 
Rather, this seems closer to the interpretation of Van Dyke, that ethnic communities should have the 
human right to self-determination as rights-and-duty-bearing units. As the IACHR states, the ownership 
of the land is not centered on an individual, but rather on the group and its community. Thus, the moral 
right is placed on the group and the Guaraní people as a corporate unit has a collective human right to 
property over their ancestral lands. However, this right is not based on them being a discriminated 
minority (although the IACHR, all through the report, outlines the historic injustices experienced by the 
indigenous peoples in Bolivia) or an ethnic community. The interpretation, thus, departs a bit from Van 
Dyke’s argumentation that ethnic communities should have group rights, as peoples with the right to 
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self-determination, and act as an intermediary between the collective rights of nation-states and 
individual human rights. Rather, the Indigenous Peoples’, in this case the Guarani in the Bolivian 
Chaco, communal right to their ancestral lands is based on their special relationship with their 
territories and their communitarian tradition of land ownership. Hence, this particular interpretation of 
the human right to property is a case of sui generis, a special interpretation in the case of indigenous 
peoples, and not an across-the-board recognition of group human rights by the Inter-American system.  
As was discussed in the theory section the interest conception implies that there can be conflict 
between competing interests, with competing correlative duties. In the Case of the Captive 
Communities in the Commission argues for the need to demarcate the Guarani ancestral territories. As 
shall be seen below, some of this land is, however, already the private property of local estate owners 
and the government of Bolivia must make land reforms in order to reallocate territory. Thus, when 
following the IACHR’s interpretation of the collective property right of indigenous people to their 
ancestral territories, the State finds itself in a situation of competing interest between the communal 
property rights of the Guarani and the private property rights of individual estate owners. This leads to 
competing correlative duties for the State, given that it cannot respect two types of property rights to 
the same piece of land. The IACHR lays out the developed framework of the Inter-American System 
for dealing with such competing correlative duties: 
“In those case in which the restitution of ancestral lands of the indigenous peoples is made 
difficult by the presence of third parties who have acquired title to or possession of those lands, 
the guidelines under the provisions and case law of the Inter-American system dictate that there 
may be restrictions on the enjoyment of and right to property if these (a) are established by 
law; (b) are necessary; (c) are proportional; and (d) are put in place for the purpose of 
achieving a legitimate objective in a democratic society.” (IACHR, 2008: 21) 
As was discussed in the theory section, some individual rights advocates fear that group rights can end 
up violating the individual rights of persons that are not members of a group. The above-mentioned 
framework, outlines how it can be necessary to trump individual property rights of third parties to 
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achieve a legitimate objective in a democratic society. In this case, that legitimate objective is to secure 
indigenous peoples property rights over their ancestral territories. This, however, does not imply that 
indigenous peoples’ property rights always trumps individual property rights. Rather, even though the 
state must take into consideration that indigenous peoples’ property right encompasses a broader 
understanding than the Western conception of property, is supposes that States has a duty to balance 
rights: 
“…the States must assess on a case by case basis, the restrictions that would result from 
recognizing one right over the other. Thus, for example, the states must take into account that 
indigenous territorial rights encompass a broader and different concept that relates to the 
collective right to survival as an organized people, with control over their habitat as a necessary 
condition for reproduction of their culture…Property of the the land ensures that the members 
of the indigenous communities preserve their cultural heritage” (IACHR, 2008: 21). 
It is beyond the scope and objective of this thesis to evaluate the success of national implementation of 
the recommendations of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. However, the proposed 
national policies, can be used as measure of the willingness to implement, and agreement with, the 
normative developments within the Inter-American System of Human Rights regarding indigenous 
peoples’ right to their ancestral territories. Legislative adaptation of the increasingly internationally 
accepted collective right of indigenous peoples to their ancestral territories is included in the Bolivian 
Constitution: 
“As regards the territorial organization of the State, the current Constitution recognizes the 
Indigenous territories and the right of autonomy of those territories. The Collective property 
rights of indigenous peoples are recognized, protected, and guaranteed, and these are 
recognized as inalienable, imprescribable, and unattachable” (IACHR, 2008: 57). 
The IACHR recognizes “the efforts made by the State to address this situation, and finds that the 
Bolivian State has attempted to direct its agrarian policy to this end, among others” (IACHR, 2008: 4). 
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Most significantly, the State has issued Supreme Decree No. 29292 creating the 2007-2008 Transitory 
Inter-Ministerial Plan for the Guarani people, which according to the IACHR: 
“…represent significant efforts to eradicate forced labor and at the same time address the needs 
for territory and generate dignified living conditions for the Guarani families and communities 
in the Bolivian Chaco” (IACHR, 2008: 59). 
The land reforms has, however, met obstacles and delays in the process of returning lands to the 
Guaraní people (IACHR, 2008: 59). Bolivia is one of the poorest countries in the world and naturally 
this affects its resources to divert toward implementing policies. Moreover, as regards solving the 
situation of the captive communities in the Bolivian Chaco “…the weakness of state institutions is 
added to the political influence that has been exercised by the local and regional power 
groups” (IACHR, 2008: 42). Attempts by the authorities to carry out tasks of clearing land title for 
indigenous peoples, have been met by great hostility from ranchers and local elites. In one instance, on 
February 29, 2008, a commission made up of the Vice-Minister of lands, INRA staff, and the president 
of the Asamblea del Pueblo Guarani (APG) were kidnapped and threatened by a group of 25 armed 
men at the command of local estate owners (IACHR, 2008: 37). In another instance, on April 4, 2008, 
the Vice-Minister of lands, 40 government employees, 36 police agents, and approximately 50 Guarani 
persons were attacked with stones and bullets by ranchers and estate owners with ties to the political 
and business elite in Santa Cruz. (IACHR, 2008: 37) The most extreme example happened to a Guarani 
lawyer: 
“The Commission learned during its visits that the Guarani lawyer who was part of the above-
mentioned delegation was beaten unconscious with sticks and belts, his feet and hands were 
bound, and he was taken to the public plaza in Cuevo, where he was lashed, and then tied to a 
post where he remained for two hours and continued to be subjected to physical 
punishment” (IACHR, 2008: 38-39). 
Lastly, I shall deal briefly with the 2009 follow-up report on the 2007 report. The Commission 
reiterates some of the same positions reflected in the previous reports. Most of the part, of the section 
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on the captive communities in the Bolivian Chaco, deals specifically with the issue of eradication of 
situations of bondage and arrangements analogous to slavery, which is not to relevant to this study of 
indigenous peoples’ collective property rights. The Commission does, however, stress that: 
“In addition, with respect to the efforts of the Bolivian State since publication of Access to 
Justice and Social Inclusion, the Commission notes that on November 28, 2007, the 
government decreed the need to expropriate 180,000 hectares of land in the Provinces of Luis 
Calvo and Hernando Siles, Department of Chuquisaca, in order to return them over to more 
than 12,000 Guarani persons in the area” (IACHR, 2009: point 171).    
To sum up, the IACHR has advanced its (as well as that of the IACrtHR) interpretation of the right to 
self-determination and the right to property, based on Article 21 of the American Convention, the ILO 
Convention 169 and the UNDRIP. This collective interpretation of the right to property seems to be at 
odds with the traditional conception of human rights as individual rights only, or at least as group rights 
derived from individual human rights. Placing moral rights on indigenous peoples as groups, this 
interpretation adds a relative perspective to the universal human rights system. Under this 
interpretation, indigenous peoples have human rights that other human beings, particularly non-
indigenous people, do not have. The Bolivian state, however, seems dedicated to implementing the 
recommendations of the IACHR regarding giving title to the Guarani people living in captive 
communities over their ancestral lands. This has, nonetheless, proved difficult, as the authorities have 
been met by great hostility from local elites and land owners. 
4.3. Comparison of the two cases 
Following the methodological research strategy, I shall now compare the two studied cases and draw 
conclusions based on differences and similarities in the two cases. Dealing first with similarities, the 
two cases fall within the same human rights system. Naturally, both the United States and Bolivia are 
subject to the Universal system of human rights, as it applies to all countries on this planet. They are, 
however, also part of the same regional human rights system: The Inter-American human rights system. 
Following the most different systems design, this is the principal similarity. As mentioned in the 
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beginning of the analysis, the regional human rights systems could be seen as playing the role of 
adapting universal human rights to account for the regions cultural and political traditions. 
The IACHR does make, to a high degree, the same argumentation in the two cases, as to what regards 
the collective rights of indigenous peoples to their ancestral territories. The advanced indigenous 
peoples’ rights framework is, of course, much stronger and more expansive in the case of the Guarani 
captive communities in Bolivia. In the case of the Dann sisters, the Commission outlines the property 
rights enshrined in the American Declaration and how these, seen in the light of newer normative 
developments in terms of the recognition of indigenous peoples’ collective rights, protects these 
peoples’ right to the lands they have traditionally occupied and used. Considering that the issue at hand 
in the Dann case specifically was the Dann bands right to their ancestral territories, the argumentation 
does not seem that strong. Especially when compared to the argumentation advanced in the case of the 
captive communities in the Bolivian Chaco. 
In this case, the IACHR makes a strong case for the need for the Bolivian government to secure access 
to the ancestral territories of the affected Guarani communities, even though the specific issue at hand 
was the practices of contemporary forms of slavery. In the reports on this case, the IACHR advanced an 
extensive interpretation of indigenous peoples’ property rights to their ancestral lands, based on Article 
21 of the American Convention. This interpretation was again based on normative developments at the 
regional and international level regarding indigenous peoples’ collective human rights. 
However, there are some temporal considerations to include in the comparison between the two cases. 
In the intermediary period between the two cases, great advances has been made in terms of indigenous 
rights. Especially, the entering into force of the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples. Furthermore, there has been advances at the regional level as well in the Inter-American 
System of Human Rights. The 2001 case Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni v. Nicaragua, affirming 
Indigenous peoples’ collective property rights as guaranteed under Article 21 of the American 
Convention, happened around the same time as the IACHR did its report on the Mary and Carrie Dann 
Case. To this one might add that the United States is not a party to this Convention, since they have 
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never ratified it. Moreover, the case of the 2007 case Saramaka people v. Suriname, in which the 
IACrtHR affirmed the right of Indigenous People to free, prior and informed consent on resource 
extraction projects, and the like, on their ancestral lands. 
Consequently, having these temporal advances in mind, the two interpretations of the indigenous rights 
framework applicable in the two case are not that different. It does not seem unthinkable to imagine 
that had the two cases been reported on at the same time, the interpretation and arguments would be 
near identical. This brings it to the differences between the two cases. The principal difference is the 
outcome of the two reports. As this thesis has not measured national data as to evaluate the degree of 
success of implementing the Inter-American human rights framework nationally, by outcome I mean 
the arguments, discourse and attempt to implement the recommendations from which one can measure 
the degree to which the two States are on the same page as the IACHR. 
And in this sense, the outcomes have been very different in the two cases. In the case of Mary and 
Carrie Dann, the United States respectfully declined to follow the recommendations of the IACHR. 
Additionally, neither did the US accept the IACHR interpretation of analyzing the American 
Declaration in the light of more recent developments in the regional and international systems of 
human rights, nor did it accept the premise that there are such a thing as human collective human 
rights. Bolivia, on the other hand, though implementation seems to have been somewhat unsuccessful, 
has taken on land reforms to expropriate territories for the Guaraní peoples in captive communities. 
Furthermore, the Bolivian state, in general, seems to be closer to the IACHRs normative understanding 
of indigenous peoples collective rights, given that these peoples are recognized in the constitution as 
peoples in the Plurinational State of Bolivia. 
On the other hand, there are also some spacial considerations to be made in this comparative study. 
Bolivia and the United States of America are very different countries.  It seems curious to consider 
Barelli’s point that the Inter-American system, as well as other regional systems, could play the role of 
adapting universal human rights to the political and cultural systems of the region. It seems strange to 
consider Bolivia and the United States to fit under the same cultural and political umbrella. While 
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Bolivia is one of the poorest countries in the world, the US is one of the richest. Whereas, the US has a 
very stable political system, if one does not consider the fact that the US Congress brings the country 
on the verge of bankruptcy from time to time, whereas the political arrangement in Bolivia is rather 
unstable. It seems unthinkable that a representative of a US delegation assigned on a public task would 
get tied to pole and whipped while carrying out his duties. Furthermore, while only a small percentage 
of the US population are indigenous, 60 per cent in Bolivia are indigenous peoples. Ultimately, there 
are also differences in the severity of, as well as expected degree of difficulty, in solving the problem in 
the two cases. Whereas the Dann Sister just wanted their right to their ancestral territory to be 
recognized in order to continue living there and grazing there cattle, the Guaraní communities were 
trapped in a two-faced issue of being held captive and lacking lands for means of survival. 
Consequently, when one considers these differences, it seems that it would have been easier for the US 
to implement the recommendations of the IACHR. Of course, the degree of difficulty is not he decisive 
factor. Rather, the problem is that the US did not accept or agree on the interpretations of the Inter-
American system. The Dann case reflects well the individual-collective rights debate, as well as that of 
the relativity-universality of human rights. The IACHR advances an interpretation of property rights 
that guarantees group rights to indigenous peoples as peoples with the right to self-determination. This 
interpretation of property rights mirrors the indigenous understanding of land ownership. Thus, it 
brings a great degree of relativity into the human right to property: A group specific right that is 
morally vested in peoples, not in human beings. The US interpretation of human rights, however, does 
not recognize that group rights can be human rights. Thus The IACHR’s interpretation relativizes a 
universal human right, which then again is relative to where one lives in the the Americas. In a system, 
where states can respectfully decline to follow recommendations of the regional institutions, 
indigenous peoples’ enjoyment of their collective right to their ancestral lands is relative to the state in 
which they live. 
Consequently, to reflect on the relativity and universality of indigenous peoples’ group human right to 
property, the interpretation advanced by the IACHR seems to put individual human rights as 
subordinate to the group human rights of indigenous people. In the case of indigenous peoples property 
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rights, according to the Inter-American system, states must take into account the special relationship 
that these peoples have with their land, as well as the aspect that the enjoyment of access to these 
territories affect other human rights of these peoples. Furthermore, in assessing its correlative duties the 
state must consider the importance of this territory to the cultural survival of indigenous peoples as 
corporate units. Whereas the property rights of non-indigenous persons only encompasses the right not 
to have their property rights violated, based on the justification that they have a right to own the 
property or land in question. This interpretation must worry scholars, and others, who ascribe to an 
individualist-human-rights-only perspective, such as Donnelly, or a view that group human right must 
be derived from the rights of individual rights-holders, such as Freeman. 
This interpretation is, nevertheless, also a recognition that the historical and continued discrimination 
faced by indigenous peoples must be solved and is a matter of solving the greatest discriminatory 
practice left behind by colonization: The disposition of Indigenous territories. In that sense, the 
justification is similar to the one behind policies of affirmative action. Only in this case, they are not 
just legal rights, but moral rights. Furthermore, as Donnelly argues, there might be case to be made for 
indigenous human group rights. If indigenous communities are more or less on a global scale subject to 
threats to their autonomy, equality, and dignity and if those threats cannot be countered by existing 
rights to non-discrimination and freedom of association, then it may make sense to recognize 
indigenous peoples’ international human rights. Which, of course, is what has happened. As has already 
been outlined in this thesis, the recognition of indigenous peoples collective human rights is not a 
phenomenon happening only in the Inter-American system, but rather a global project in other regional 
systems and at the UN level. Hence, the adoption of the UNDRIP must be seen to provide a great deal 
of universality to the concept of indigenous peoples group human rights. 
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6. Conclusion 
  
This thesis has taken on a comparative study of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights’ 
reports on two cases: the case of Mary and Carrie Dann, Sisters and members of the Western Shoshone, 
and the Case of captive communities of Guaraní people, in the United States and Bolivia respectively. 
Mary and Carrie Dann are members of the Western Shoshone people, who have traditionally occupied 
a territory of 60 million acres covering and area that crosses several contemporary state borders in the 
Western USA. The Western Shoshone nation signed a peace agreement with the United States 
government in 1963 during the Civil War. According to the terms of the agreement, the United States 
would be allowed free passage through Western Shoshone territory to reach the gold fields in 
California. There was no cession of land, however. From this point on a process of gradual 
encroachment by non-indigenous peoples into Western Shoshone territory took place. In 1946 the 
Indian Claims Commission (ICC) was set down to handle issues of compensation with regards to 
indigenous peoples’ territory of which they had lost possession. As regards the Western Shoshone 
territory, the ICC dealt with a group of Western Shoshone indigenous peoples called the Temoak band 
over the status of the entirety of 24 million acres of Shoshone lands. Based on the case of the Temoak 
band the ICC concluded that the Western Shoshone title to the lands were extinguished due to the 
process of gradual encroachment by non-indigenous settlers and that a compensation of 15 cents per 
acre was to be paid. The Dann sisters tried to intervene in the process stating that their title was not 
extinguished as they were still occupying and making use of a part of the lands in question, but the ICC 
did not allow for the Dann sisters to interfere in the process of settling title over the territory. 
In the case of the Guarani peoples living in captive communities, the IACHR analyzed the situation of 
600 Guarani peoples living under condition of bondage or analogous to slavery in the Bolivian Chaco. 
These families would receive little or nor pay at all. They would rent their small plots of land from the 
local estate owner, and work these lands in order to pay him back. The estate owner would keep the 
books with the calculations regarding the status of the back payments of the money that the Guarani 
workers owed him. Given that many of the Guarani workers are illiterate is was practically impossible 
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for them to keep track of the status of back payments on their accumulated debt. This, coupled with the 
fact that they would be paid very little money, means that they were, de facto, tied to the lands and 
captive in this situation. Furthermore, the debt would at times be passed on to the next generation and 
in some cases these workers would be bought by another estate owner, through a process of debt 
takeover. A great degree of racism persists towards the Guarani people and the estate owners would 
argue that these people are lazy and needs an arrangement such as this. These perceptions would lead 
some owners to whip, or in other ways punish, their workers. 
The recommendations of the IACHR are to a great extent influenced by, and part of, a larger trend of 
increasing international attention to the importance of recognizing indigenous peoples’ rights to their 
ancestral lands. The UN put focus on the issue already in 1972, when a United Nations expert, José R. 
Martínez Cobo, carried out The study of the problem of discrimination against Indigenous Peoples. 
This study created the environment which led to the creation of the Working Group on Indigenous 
Peoples (IWGIA). The most significant international document dealing with indigenous peoples’ rights 
is the International Labour Organisation’s Convention No. 169.  This convention is of significant value, 
as it is binding to those states which have signed and ratified it. The problem is that very few countries 
have actually done so. As of this date, only 22 countries have ratified the convention. The document, 
however, has further shortcomings. Among this, is the failure to recognize indigenous peoples as 
peoples proper with the right to self-determination. Therefore, the international agenda of securing 
indigenous peoples’ rights continued at the UN level. In the 1990s the Working Group on Indigenous 
Populations started preparing a draft declaration, which would lead to the final adoption of the United 
Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP). Despite being only a declaration 
and as such are not legally binding to states, the declaration has become the pivotal protection 
mechanism for indigenous peoples. Unlike the ILO Convention No. 169, the UNDRIP both includes 
the concept of self-determination and also refers to indigenous peoples’ collective rights. 
Nonetheless, the UNDRIP was long under way and during the process of analysis and negotiation at the 
UN level, the regional human rights systems contributed greatly to both the political process of 
recognition of indigenous rights as well as the legal process of clarification. In the case of the Inter-
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American system, the IACHR had already by the 1970s been making reference to infringements on 
indigenous peoples’ land rights and had shown that they were aware of the special relationship these 
peoples have their ancestral territories. In the case of the Yanomami peoples in Brazil, who had 
infrastructural and exploitation activities taking place on their lands, the IACHR recommended that the 
State demarcate the boundaries of Yanomami territory as these activities violated the right to life, health 
and personal security as recognized in the American Declaration. The Inter-American court has also 
played a significant role. In the 2001 case, Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community v. Nicaragua, the 
court argued that the special relationship with their ancestry and communal system of ownership 
provided indigenous peoples with protection under Article 21 of the American Convention.. In another 
case in 2007, Saramaka People v. Suriname, the Court established that resources on indigenous lands 
were also protected by the American Convention. 
The analysis of this thesis has been carried out on the basis on a theoretical discussion of the relative-
universality of human rights, as well individual and group human rights. To Mutua, human rights are a 
manifestation of the historical continuum of the Eurocentric colonial project. A framework in which 
Westerners are the saviors and third world persons are either victims of savages. Donnelly rejects the 
Western characteristics of Human Rights and argues that, though they developed first in the west, this 
is merely a manifestation of a political response to counter the threats of modernity, namely states and 
markets. Donnelly’s theory on the relative universality of human rights, divides these rights into their 
universal and relative aspects. They are universal because human rights are the rights of humans and 
today we consider all members of the species Homo Sapiens to be humans. Consequently, Donnelly 
does not recognize group human rights, since they are based on groups rather than individual human 
beings. The relativity of human rights, to Donnelly, is introduced by the concept of sovereign nation 
states. First of all, as there, except in the European system, are no supranational bodies to force nation 
states to comply, human rights are enjoyed relatively depending on the extent to which the state, in 
which one happens to live, respect human rights. Scondly, interpretation and implementation of 
international human rights is left to the nation state. 
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Other scholars, however, argue that the pure focus on individual human rights, leaves out the fact that 
humans are social beings and a life in dignity requires the recognition of the importance that belonging 
to a group has to an individuals identity. Jones, Freeman and Van dyke argue that it is not logical to see 
the right to self-determination as an individual right, as it’s a collectively enjoyed right. In extension of 
this, Freeman and Van Dyke both highlight how classical liberal Scholars, such as Locke, Hobbes and 
Rousseau, were over focused on the right of the majority in a society and overlooked the rights of 
minorities. Since then, many rights have affirmed that communities can in fact have rights. Examples 
are the political representation guaranteed to linguistic communities in Belgium and the policies of 
affirmative action that were implemented in the US in the 1960s and 1970s. These are, nonetheless, 
legal rights and not moral rights, not human rights. 
Joseph Raz’ interests conception shows how considering the accumulated interests of individuals 
within a group, can provide justification to put correlative duties on duty-bearers, in cases where the 
interest of the individual human being would not suffice. Both Freeman and Van Dyke advances the 
argument that some groups should have human rights. To Freeman, however, these right must be 
derivative to the individual rights-holders in the group, or else they are not vested in Human beings and 
therefore cannot be human rights. Van Dyke, nevertheless, argues that ethnic communities should have 
rights based on the morality of the group. According to him, since nation states are rarely 
homogeneous, ethnic communities should have rights based on their right to self-determination, just as 
nation states have. Many scholars, however, worry that giving human rights to groups puts individuals 
within groups under the tyranny of group leadership and disadvantages non-group members, when 
confronted with this group human right. 
This theoretical discussion was applied in the analysis of the reports made by the IACHR in the two 
cases of the Western Shoshone Mary and Carrie Dann in the US and the Guarani peoples living in 
captive communities in the Bolivian Chaco. Regarding the first case, on Mary and Carrie Dann, the 
IACHR argues that indigenous people have collective rights to the territories they have traditionally 
occupied and used. This is the case even if they do not have legal title to their lands. Thus, in the case 
of Mary and Carrie Dann, the IACHR concludes that the Dann Band have a right to be involved in the 
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process by playing a full or effective role in retaining, authorizing or instructing the Western Shoshone 
claimants in the ICC process. This interpretation is reached by looking at the property rights of 
American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man in the context of more recent recognition at the 
regional and international level of indigenous peoples’ right to their ancestral territories. The response 
of the United States of respectfully declining to follow the recommendations of the IACHR, reflects 
well the dichotomy between individual and group human rights. While the IACHR’s interpretation is 
closer to the group-specific indigenous perception of property rights, the United States government 
positions itself closer to the individualist conception of property rights. 
In the other case, on the Guarani peoples living in captivity, the IACHR has advanced its (as well as 
that of the IACrtHR) interpretation of the right to self-determination and the right to property, based on 
Article 21 of the American Convention, the ILO Convention 169 and the UNDRIP. This collective 
interpretation of the right to property seems to be at odds with the traditional conception of human 
rights as individual rights only, or at least as group rights derived from individual human rights. Placing 
moral rights on indigenous peoples as groups, this interpretation adds a relative perspective to the 
universal human rights system. Under this interpretation, indigenous peoples have human rights that 
other human beings, particularly non-indigenous people, do not have. The Bolivian state, however, 
seems dedicated to implementing the recommendations of the IACHR regarding giving title to the 
Guarani people living in captive communities over their ancestral lands. This has, nonetheless, proved 
difficult, as the authorities have been met by great hostility from local elites and land owners. 
This comparative study allowed for some interesting conclusion to be made. Even though the IACHR 
advanced the same interpretation and similar recommendations, the reception of the these 
recommendations were very different in the two cases. The Bolivian government has taken on land 
reforms based on the recommendations of the IACHR. Even though implementation of these reforms 
has proven difficult due to hostility from local landed elites, the Bolivian government seems to share 
the interpretation of the IACHR regarding indigenous peoples’ collective human rights to their 
ancestral lands. The United States government, on the other hand, respectfully declined to follow the 
recommendations of the IACHR and further added that they do not recognize collective human rights. 
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The end result being, that the framework of collective human rights of indigenous peoples are relatively 
enjoyed depending on where an indigenous person lives in the Americas. 
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